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THAT WHICH BELONGS TO ALL:Khipus,
Community, and Indigenous Legal Activism
in the Early Colonial Andes
In recent years, scholars from a variety of fields have advanced the ideathat native legal activism worked as one of the most widespread andeffective strategies for the defense of communal assets, political autonomy,
and customary law in early colonial Peru. Indigenous claimants, petitioners,
and legal intermediaries begin to appear in the historical record just ten years
after the initial encounter at Cajamarca in 1532. After embracing Iberian legal
culture in the early 1540s, individuals of noble Inca descent began to engage
with local and metropolitan courts, preparing letters, reports, petitions, and
proofs of services andmerit aimed at securing their status within the new order.1
Earlier drafts of this work were presented at the John TePaske Seminar in Colonial Latin American History at Duke
University and at the 60th Annual Conference of the Rocky Mountain Council for Latin American Studies in Santa Fe,
NewMexico. The author wishes to thank his colleagues in this special issue, as well as John D. Charles, Susan Ramirez,
Frank Salomon, and Frank de la Teja for their invaluable comments and suggestions. Gratitude is also extended to the
reviewers of this article for The Americas.
1. For the legal activism of the early colonial Inca nobility, see John Hemming, The Conquest of the Incas (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970); Gonzalo Lamana, Domination without Dominance: Inca-Spanish Encounters
in Early Colonial Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Kerstin Nowack, “Aquellas sen˜oras del linaje real de
los Incas: vida y supervivencia de las mujeres de la nobleza inca en el Peru´ en los primeros an˜os de la Colonia,” in Elites
indı´genas en los Andes: nobles, caciques y cabildantes bajo el yugo colonial, David Patrick Cahill and Blanca Tovı´as, eds.
(Quito: Abya-Yala, 2003), pp. 17–53; and Udo Oberem, “La familia del Inca Atahualpa bajo el dominio espan˜ol,”
in Contribucio´n a la etnohistoria ecuatoriana, Segundo Moreno Ya´n˜ez and Udo Oberem, eds. (Otavalo: Instituto
Otavalen˜o de Antropologı´a, 1981), pp. 153–226. On indigenous litigation in the Andean region, see Jacques Poloni-
Simard, “Los indios ante la justicia. El pleito como parte de la consolidacio´n de la sociedad colonial,” inMa´scaras, tretas
y rodeos del discurso colonial en los Andes, Bernard Lavalle´, ed. (Lima: Instituto France´s de Estudios Andinos; Pontificia
Universidad Cato´lica del Peru´; Instituto Riva-Agu¨ero, 2005), pp. 177–188; Karen Spalding, Huarochirı´: An Andean
Society under Inca and Spanish Rule (Stanford: Stanford University, 1984); Steve J. Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples and
the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). The Andes still
lag behind New Spain, where the efforts to conceptualize indigenous interaction with the court system after the classic
works of Charles Gibson on the Mexicas and Tlaxcalans have gone further. See among others Jovita Baber, “Native
Litigiousness, Cultural Change and the Spanish Legal System in Tlaxcala, New Spain (1580–1640),” Political and
Legal Anthropology Review 24:2 (2001), pp. 94–106; Susan Kellogg, Law and the Transformation of Aztec Culture,
1500–1700 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995); Brian P. Owensby, Empire of Law and Indian Justice in
Colonial Mexico (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Ethelia Ruiz Medrano and Susan Kellogg, Negotiation
within Domination: New Spain’s Indian Pueblos Confront the Spanish State (Boulder: University Press of Colorado,
2010); and Yanna Yannakakis, The Art of Being In-Between: Native Intermediaries, Indian Identity, and Local Rule in
Colonial Oaxaca (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008).
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Native lords (caciques) and communities of non-Inca origin joined as active
litigants and petitioners in the late 1540s, hiring advocates and solicitors and
sending their own delegations to tend to their legal affairs in Lima, seat of a
royal court of appeal. During the two decades that followed the promulgation
of the New Laws (1542), which granted these courts of appeal or audiencias
in the Americas the right to assess and revise Indian tributary quotas, Lima
experienced an explosion of litigation by native polities requesting a reduction
of their fiscal burdens and caciques seeking confirmation of their chiefly rank.
Lawsuits pertaining to lands and pastures, town boundaries, and lordship
(cacicazgo) rights soon ensued. In the early 1560s, the first Andean caciques
crossed the Atlantic on behalf of their communities and reached the still-
itinerant Habsburg court. Indigenous groups quickly became expert litigators
in secular and ecclesiastical courts. Their legal activism continued unabated
throughout the Habsburg era.2
What formed the basis for this type of collective legal action? In line with
Castilian judicial procedure, bringing petitions and filing lawsuits before the
audiencia in Lima or the Council of the Indies in Madrid was done mostly
in writing, sometimes by indigenous petitioners and litigants themselves, but
primarily by the Spanish advocates, defenders, and attorneys who handled the
case once the initial complaint or petition had been filed.3 As a result, surviving
legal dossiers often seem like discrete and self-contained worlds of ink and paper
wherein the opening demand or petition signals the beginning of indigenous
2. Recent approaches to indigenous legal activism before the audiencia and the archbishopric of Lima include
John Charles, “‘More Ladino than Necessary’: Indigenous Litigants and the Language Policy Debate in Mid-Colonial
Peru,”Colonial Latin AmericanReview 16:1 (2007), pp. 23–47;Allies at Odds: The AndeanChurch and Its Indigenous
Agents, 1583–1671 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010); “Felipe Guaman Poma en los foros de la
justicia eclesia´stica,” in Los indios, el derecho canónico y la justicia eclesiástica en la América virreinal, Ana de Zaballa
Beascoechea, ed. (Madrid; Frankfurt: Iberoamericana/Vervuert, 2011), pp. 203–222; Renzo Honores, “Litigiosidad
indı´gena ante la Real Audiencia de Lima, 1552–1598” (Bachelor’s thesis: Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica del Peru´,
1993); Honores, “La asistencia jurı´dica privada a los sen˜ores indı´genas ante la Real Audiencia de Lima, 1552–1570,”
paper presented at the XXIV International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (Dallas, March 27–29,
2003); Honores, “Una sociedad legalista: abogados, procuradores de causas y la creacio´n de una cultura legal colonial
en Lima y Potosı´, 1540–1670” (PhD diss.: Florida International University, 2007); “Caciques as Legal Benefactors:
Cacical Legal Offensive in the Andes, 1550–1572,” paper presented at the 123rd Annual Meeting of the American
Historical Association/CLAH (New York, January 2–5, 2009); and Jeremy Mumford, “Litigation as Ethnography in
Sixteenth-Century Peru: Polo de Ondegardo and the Mitimaes,” Hispanic American Historical Review 88:1 (2008),
pp. 5–40. For transatlantic litigation, see Alcira Duen˜as, Indians and Mestizos in the “Lettered City”: Reshaping Justice,
Social Hierarchy, and Political Culture in Colonial Peru (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2010); Jeremy
Mumford, “Aristocracy on the Auction Block: Race, Lords, and the Perpetuity Controversy of Sixteenth-Century
Peru,” in Imperial Subjects: Race and Identity in Colonial Latin America, Andrew B. Fisher and Matthew D. O’Hara,
eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), pp. 35–59; and Jose´ Carlos de la Puente Luna, “The Many Tongues of
the King: Indigenous Language Interpreters and the Making of the Spanish Empire,” Colonial Latin American Review
23:2 (2014), pp. 143–170.
3. There were, of course, certain notable exceptions, as we know that native Andean and mestizo litigants
sometimes brought petitions directly to the American audiencias and the royal court in order to bypass these royal
officials. The number of litigants filing petitions directly seems to have increased over time. For a sampler of prominent
cases, see Duen˜as, Indians and Mestizos.
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concerted legal action. But appearing in writing before the magistrates of
the king, in Peru but especially in Spain, was oftentimes the culmination of
communal mechanisms of coordination, negotiation, and decision making that
Andean groups had set in motion before filing the first petition. Internal and
collective processes that guaranteed a regular stream of resources, part of which
were invested in securing legal assistance and royal favor at different levels, also
lay beyond the record, even though they were crucial for producing satisfactory
outcomes and sustaining legal endeavors over time and across space.4
This article delves into some of the practices and institutions that made
petitioning the king and litigating in his courts possible. It counters the
intrinsic tendency of the judicial archive to efface the contributions made by
mid-ranking native officials of the municipal councils, legal intermediaries,
and, ultimately, commoners to native Andean ‘litigiousness.’ Judicial advocacy
opened multiple paths to power within litigating communities, but these paths
were not necessarily restricted to the elite of pre-Hispanic origin and their
descendants, or to the different factions within this cacique privileged class.
In other words, power did not always flow from top to bottom. It could
not. Large-scale litigation demanded that some of that power be built and
maintained from the ground up.5
In part because of the built-in distortions of the judicial record and the
procedural rules of the legal system, members of the traditional Andean
elites, whom the literature generically identifies as “caciques,” appear as the
visible heads in most lawsuits and administrative procedures. Their recognized
position at the top of the Repu´blica de Indios demanded it be so. What is more,
they seem to have stood at the forefront of the natives’ legal offensive that
started in earnest in the 1550s. As scholars have shown, many Andean lords,
by adapting their position as administrators of communal labor and wealth as
well as protectors of the weak and destitute, reinvented themselves as the “legal
benefactors” of their subjects.6 Yet, the legal advocacy of the cacique class was
4. Brian Owensby makes a similar point in his study about indigenous peoples’ engagements with the judicial
system in seventeenth-century Mexico: “Despite all the writing, much remains shadowy about the encounters these
records depict: How did a party decide to file a petition? Why did a lawsuit continue over months or years at great
expense or why was it dropped after a certain point? Why did a particular case turn out as it did and how did parties
understand the outcome?” Owensby, Empire of Law, p. 9.
5. Owensby notes that, through the legal system, indigenous commoners “found greater if still limited
opportunities to say ‘no’ to excessive demands by encomenderos, corregidores, and principales, in effect to negotiate
the terms of their subjection.” Ibid., p. 40. This point has been made by William Taylor as well. Taylor argues that,
unless we bring back the consideration of “politics” into colonial law and its processes, we will be leaving out most of
the population as “unpolitical.” William B. Taylor, “Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Inquiry into
Early Latin American Social History, 1500–1900,” in Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History, Olivier Zunz, ed.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), pp. 115–190, p. 162.
6. Duen˜as, Indians and Mestizos; Honores, “Litigiosidad indı´gena”; Honores, “La asistencia jurı´dica”;
Mumford, “Litigation as Ethnography.” These works build on previous studies about the caciques’ adaptation to
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of an ambivalent nature. As the colonial record also shows, caciques litigated
against their Indian subjects as often as they sued other Andean nobles and
neighboring communities, non-Indian actors, and the Crown’s representatives.
Some Andean lords, because of their wealth, power, literacy, and relatively easy
access to the justice system, were in an advantageous position to seize land,
labor, and other resources by judicial means, passing these assets on to their
descendants and placing them outside of communal control. Among certain
indigenous communities of the Andes, these and other scenarios, far from being
mutually exclusive, must have unfolded simultaneously.7
This article takes the discussion about native Andeans and the courts in
a different direction by reframing cacique legal activism within the wider
realm of social norms and expectations to which it was said to belong: the
inner management and defense of communal assets—the bienes del comu´n or
bienes de comunidad. Contemporary testimonies describe these assets somewhat
elusively as sapci, a Quechua term that roughly translates as ‘that which belongs
to all.’ These shared endowments were characterized as common resources
that ideally belonged to the collectivity. They constituted a reserve to be
used for the exclusive benefit of the commons, especially that of its most
vulnerable members. These communal funds, obtained through the labor of
able-bodied members of the group, provided the material basis that would
make large-scale, community-wide litigation possible. As labor-based tribute
was supplanted by demands for money, goods, and labor during the second
half of the sixteenth century, the colonial courts became particularly useful to
indigenous communities engaged in preserving or increasing their communal
assets.
In this context, it must have been the amassing and propermanagement of these
resources in the first place, through the local government’s internal mechanisms
colonial rule, which included litigation in colonial courts. See for instance John V. Murra, “Litigation over the Rights
of ‘Natural Lords’ in Early Colonial Courts in the Andes,” inNative Traditions in the PostconquestWorld, Elizabeth Hill
Boone and Thomas Cummins, eds. (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1998), pp. 55–62; Franklin Pease G. Y.,
Curacas, reciprocidad y riqueza (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica del Peru´, 1999); and Thierry Saignes, “De la
borrachera al retrato: los caciques andinos entre dos legitimidades (Charcas),”Revista Andina 9 (1987), pp. 139–170.
7. For works that show how litigation, inasmuch as it allowed for the privatization of collective resources, could
unleash intra-communal processes of social differentiation, thus widening the gap between these native elites and their
indigenous subjects, see Scarlett O’Phelan, Kurakas sin sucesiones: del cacique al alcalde de indios (Peru´ y Bolivia, 1750–
1830) (Cuzco: Centro Bartolome´ de Las Casas, 1997); S. Elizabeth Penry, “Transformations in Indigenous Authority
and Identity in Resettlement Towns of Colonial Charcas (Alto Peru)” (PhD diss.: University of Miami, 1996); Jose´
Carlos de la Puente Luna, Los curacas hechiceros de Jauja. Batallas ma´gicas y legales en el Peru´ colonial (Lima: Pontificia
Universidad Cato´lica del Peru´, 2007); Susan E. Ramirez, TheWorld Upside Down: Cross-Cultural Contact and Conflict
in Sixteenth-Century Peru (Stanford: Stanford University, 1996); Karen Spalding, De indio a campesino: cambios en
la estructura social del Peru´ colonial (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1974); Huarochirı´; Steve J. Stern, “The
Social Significance of Judicial Institutions in an Exploitative Society: Huamanga, Peru, 1570–1640,” in The Inca and
Aztec States, 1400–1800: Anthropology and History, George Collier, Renato Rosaldo, and John Wirth, eds. (New York:
Academic Press, 1983), pp. 289–320; and Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples.
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of attaining consensus and implementing collective decisions that allowed
certain native groups to successfully fund, undertake, and complete their
legal initiatives before regional and imperial courts of justice. In other words,
litigation, irrespective of the outcomes of particular lawsuits and negotiations,
became one of the driving forces behind communal reproduction among
certain Andean polities inasmuch as it urged these corporate groups to generate
and preserve the sapci funds needed to seek justice and favor from the Crown.
These funds thus became an important mechanism for protecting their interests
vis-a`-vis other colonial actors, caciques included. There are certainly other
possible scenarios. Among other Andean polities, an ever-increasing demand
for collective resources to finance litigation, along with the mismanagement
of sapci funds by indigenous leaders, must have posed a serious threat—
perhaps even a death blow—to the preservation of communal forms of social
organization and reproduction.
The analysis of sapci funds that follows places cacique legal activism at the
center of this wider but still understudied reality. The discussion calls for
a reconceptualization of native litigation that includes wider segments of
indigenous rural society, in particular the tribute-paying commoners who,
though generally relegated to the background in the documentation, provided
the surplus that allowed the authorities to seek redress in colonial courts. Like
many Mesoamerican towns, Andean polities were also pueblos litigantes.8 The
argument thus calls for the inclusion of the officials of the Indian municipal
councils (cabildos) who were entrusted with collective endowments. In this
view, the stewards of communal funds (administradores or mayordomos), along
with the indigenous accountants (contadores), cord keepers (khipucamayuq),
and municipal attorneys (procuradores), emerge as key legal intermediaries,
facilitating native populations’ access to the courts. From this perspective,
Andean commoners and municipal authorities, more so than traditional elites,
appear as essential actors behind indigenous legal activism in early colonial Peru.
To begin exploring the legal strategies of Andean communities in connection
with the management of sapci funds, I will employ a case study, that of the
Huanca ethnic group, occasionally complementing the historical data available
for the Huancas with that of other Andean polities. Traditionally hostile to
the Incas, the Huancas were a set of interrelated ayllus, agro-pastoral kinship
groups, settled about 120 miles to the east of Lima, in the narrow, fertile
8. I borrow the expression fromDorothy Tanck de Estrada’s in-depth discussion of native towns and community
finances in late colonial Mexico. Tanck de Estrada, Pueblos de indios y educacio´n en el Me´xico colonial, 1750–1821
(Mexico: El Colegio de Me´xico, 1999), esp. chapts. 1, 2, and 6. For similar contributions of Oaxacan commoners to
the community treasuries and how municipal officers used these collective funds to support litigation, see Yannakakis,
The Art of Being In-Between, pp. 37, 120–121.
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Jauja valley and its neighboring high pastures. The Huancas still totaled
around 45,000 individuals some forty years after the conquest. Because of
their geographical proximity to the Audiencia of Lima, the commitment of
some of their legal agents, and the infrastructure that they developed for the
management of communal assets, the Huancas enjoyed ready access to the
high court of appeal and to the Council of the Indies. A reconstruction of
Huanca interactions with the court system over a period of a hundred years
will reveal the centrality of collective endowments for understanding Andean
efforts at attaining justice. Future research will determine the extent to which
the historical experience of the Huancas, from which I derive the litigation-
as-sapci model discussed here, is representative of the dynamics among other
central Andean polities located close to the viceregal court, as well as whether
these ideas can be applied successfully to other, more distant communities.
INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY: TOLEDO’S 1570 INVESTIGATION
In November 1570, Viceroy Francisco de Toledo (1569–1581) summoned the
native leaders of the Jauja valley. The purpose was to produce an Informacio´n,
a detailed account of the expenses their communities had incurred after two
decades of litigation before the audiencia and the Council of the Indies in Spain.
Upon taking control of the valley and its surrounding highlands sometime in
the fifteenth century, the Incas had reorganized the population into three units
of ten thousand tributary households each (hunus), elevating three local chiefs
to the highest rank of “lord of ten thousand households” (hunu curaca) or
“great lord” (hatun curaca) of their respective units. This decimal division,
along with its subdivisions (rounded-off units of thousands and hundreds,
called huarangas and pachacas, respectively) survived for several decades after
the Spanish conquest.9 The Inca reorganization served as the fundamental
basis for the allocation of the first encomiendas and thus the formation of
three main repartimientos de indios.10 Each was ruled by a paramount lord or
cacique principal (the colonial heir of the hatun curaca) and his subordinate
authorities, forming the repartimientos that came to include a series of pueblos,
Spanish-style native towns, founded along the Jauja River in the late 1560s and
the early 1570s. These three repartimientos came to be known as Atunjauja,
9. About the Inca and Spanish reorganizations of the Jauja valley, which I have somewhat simplified, see Terence
N. D’Altroy, Provincial Power in the Inka Empire (Washington; London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992); Martti
Pa¨rssinen, Tawantinsuyu: The Inca State and Its Political Organization (Helsinki: The Finnish Historical Society,
1992), pp. 338–341; and De la Puente Luna, Los curacas hechiceros, chapt. 3.
10. In the Jauja valley at this time, the term ‘repartimiento’ was, to a great degree, a synonym of ‘encomienda,’
a royal grant consisting of the right to collect tribute from indigenous communities. In the latter part of the sixteenth
century, however, specific groups counted as part of the smaller encomiendas or repartimientos were resettled in the
towns of the three major divisions to which I refer in this article: Atunjauja, Luringuanca, and Ananguanca.
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Luringuanca, and Ananguanca, which is also how Toledo’s 1570 inquest into
the legal expenses of the Huancas identifies them. Throughout the rest of the
colonial period, native authorities and royal bureaucrats would handle fiscal
and administrative affairs in the valley, such as collecting tribute and organizing
rotational labor drafts (mita), on the basis of these three main jurisdictions.11
The internal logic of the inquest into Huanca legal activism reflects native
hierarchies of power, Andean notions of wealth and tribute-as-labor, and
kinship-based principles of social organization. First, the leading caciques of the
three repartimientos rendered their testimony, aggregating the total expenses
of their polities. A second round of testimonies by lesser-ranking authorities
followed. These subordinate lords, generally called caciques or indios principales
but sometimes described as cobradores (collectors), were in charge of organizing
labor services and levying tribute from the smaller units, the corporate, self-
governing kinship groups that the natives called ayllus and the Spaniards
termed parcialidades (sectors, or segments). As in the rest of the Andes, these
kin-based, land-holding, and ritual groups, organized for the fulfillment of
communal labor, constituted the basic cell of native social life in the Jauja
valley.12
The native lords of the Jauja valley organized their testimony around the
following “expenses”: (1) The number of native messengers, retainers, and
porters of commoner origin that each of the parcialidades contributed to aid
caciques engaged in litigation in the 1550s and 1560s, including the number
of absentees who never returned from the warmer climate of the coast (thus
becoming “lost” for the group); (2) the specific number of pesos they had spent
in these legal initiatives before the audiencia and the Council of the Indies; and
11. Ynformac¸io´n hecha por mandado de Su Excelencia sobre los dan˜os que se han rec¸rec¸ido a los yndios del
balle de Xauxa en los pleytos que han tinido, asy en los bienes de la comunidad como en los de particulares y lo por
Su Excelencia proveydo para escusar los dichos pleytos y dan˜os y de co´mo se les mandaron quemar las provisiones
y procesos, 1570. Archivo General de Indias [hereafter AGI], Lima 28A, 63Q. A transcription of this document,
along with a detailed analysis of its context of production—Toledo’s legal reforms of the early 1570s—can be found
in Mo´nica Medelius and Jose´ Carlos de la Puente Luna, “Curacas, bienes y quipus en un documento toledano (Jauja,
1570),” Histo´rica 28:2 (2004), pp. 35–82.
12. In his recent study of the ayllus of Tupicocha, Frank Salomon defines ayllus as “non-localized, predominantly
patrilineal corporate descent groups.” He notes that “the term parcialidad denotes the outer face of the corporation,
especially its work as a segment of the community,” adding further that “the double terminology reflects the
institution’s role as the hinge connecting kinship to political organization.” Frank Salomon, The Cord Keepers: Khipus
and Cultural Life in a Peruvian Village (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), p. 57. The Tupicochan ayllus, and
Andean ayllus in general, share a series of enduring structural principles, which Salomon synthesizes as follows: “(1)
Ayllus are sibling corporations to each other; that is, they owe each other fraternal solidarity. (2) They stand in fixed
order. (3) The rank order is one of precedence, not of dominion. (4) Ayllus have separate endowments but coordinate
duties.” Ibid., p. 59. For further discussions of this context-sensitive, relative term, see Billie Jean Isbell, To Defend
Ourselves: Ecology and Ritual in an Andean Village (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1985); and Tristan Platt,
“Mirrors and Maize: The Concept of Yanantin among the Macha of Bolivia,” in Anthropological History of Andean
Polities, John V. Murra, Nathan Wachtel, and Jacques Revel, eds. (Cambridge; New York; Paris: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), pp. 228–259.
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(3) the communal assets they had to sell in order to procure these funds. The
most striking feature of this investigation about the human andmaterial costs of
litigation, however, was that the Andean lords of Jauja based their accounting
and recounting of the group’s legal endeavors almost solely on the information
that heads of ayllus and tribute collectors had carefully recorded in knotted
cords or khipus. Why did the ayllus of Jauja choose these devices to record
these efforts? And perhaps most importantly, what does such a decision tell us
about the place that collective litigation came to occupy among these Andean
communities only twenty years after the Spanish conquest?
Over the past two decades, scholars have located multiple alphabetic
“transcriptions” of the famous Andean knotted strings. As several testimonies
attest, information contained in khipus was “recited,” often through the
mediation of an interpreter, in courtrooms across the Andes from the mid-
sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. The Huanca ayllus were among the
first groups to rely on this strategy.13 Spanish judges generally admitted the
cords and their content as evidence in civil and administrative procedures,
relying on the authority and expertise of the caciques and khipu masters who
“read out” the multicolored strings before royal magistrates and inspectors.14
As in some of the best-known cases of khipu transcriptions, the cords of
Jauja contained information about the management of collective labor and
corporately owned resources, a matter of constant contention in the many
13. The Huancas are well known among scholars of the khipus. In 1549, the Huanca lords displayed before the
chronicler Pedro Cieza de Leo´n an earlier set of khipus, which registered their multiple contributions to the Spaniards
since their arrival in the Andes. These and other knotted strings served as the basis for the further elaboration of
several detailed lists (memorias) that morphed into more complex probanzas presented by the Huanca lords before the
audiencia and the Council of the Indies between 1558 and 1562. These khipu-based lists contained the number of
warriors, porters, and servants, as well as the amount of clothes, foodstuffs, and other goods, given to the Spaniards
between 1532 and 1554. Waldemar Espinoza Soriano, “Los huancas aliados de la conquista. Tres informaciones
ine´ditas sobre la participacio´n indı´gena en la conquista del Peru´,” Anales Cientı´ficos de la Universidad del Centro del
Peru´ 1 (1971–72), pp. 9–407; John V. Murra, “Las etno-categorı´as de un khipu estatal,” in Formaciones econo´micas y
polı´ticas del mundo andino (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1975), pp. 243–254. For the survival of some of
these Huanca khipus until the beginning of the seventeenth century, see Diego Da´valos de Figueroa, Primera parte
de la miscela´nea austral (Lima: Antonio Ricardo, 1602), p. 150.
14. The generic term for these specialists in Quechua is khipucamayuq, often spelled quipucamayo in the
documents and translated as ‘knot-maker’ or ‘cord-keeper.’ Some caciques served as khipucamayuqs and vice versa. For
the use of khipus (or quipus) in legal forums, see Galen Brokaw, “La recepcio´n del quipu en el siglo XVI,” in El quipu
colonial: estudios y materiales, Marco Curatola Petrocchi and Jose´ Carlos de la Puente Luna, eds. (Lima: Pontificia
Universidad Cato´lica del Peru´, 2013), pp. 119–144; A History of the Khipu (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010); Charles, Allies at Odds; Alan Durston and George Urioste, “Las peticiones en quechua del
curato de Chuschi (1678–1679),” in El quipu colonial: estudios y materiales, Curatola Petrocchi and De la Puente
Luna, eds., pp. 379–440; Beatriz Losa, “El quipu y la prueba en la pra´ctica del Derecho de Indias, 1550–1581,”
Historia y Cultura 26 (2000), pp. 11–37; Carmen Beatriz Loza, “El uso de los quipus contra la administracio´n
colonial (1550–1600),”Nueva Sı´ntesis 7–8 (2001), pp. 59–93; Tristan Platt, “‘Without Deceit or Lies’: Variable Chinu
Readings during a Sixteenth-Century Tribute-Restitution Trial,” inNarrative Threads: Accounting and Recounting in
Andean Khipu, Jeffrey Quilter and Gary Urton, eds. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002), pp. 225–265; and Gary
Urton, “From Knots to Narratives: Reconstructing the Art of Historical Record-Keeping in the Andes from Spanish
Transcriptions of Inka Khipus,” Ethnohistory 45:3 (1998), pp. 409–438.
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lawsuits that relied on the knotted strings as substantiating evidence. Late
pre-Hispanic and early colonial khipus also recorded census data, agricultural
production and heads of cattle, tribute assessments (usually measured in the
number of workers and days owed by the ayllus to the group or to the state),
and the amount and types of produce stored in communal and state-controlled
storehouses.15
In light of these precedents, khipus were the obvious medium for an accurate
recording of the legal expenses of the ayllus of Jauja. Nevertheless, the khipus
displayed before the authorities in 1570 also contained a different type of
information, to wit, the “context” of the communities’ pleitos (the generic
term for a lawsuit or court case). The Huanca khipus included information
about what was spent on these court affairs as well as how, by whom, and from
which funds the expenses were paid, thus presenting us with a type of privileged
metadata about the act of litigating itself. In other words, khipus documented
how the ayllus of Jauja and their internal authorities adapted to the demands
of the Spanish judicial system, realigning internal mechanisms of governance
and collective resource management with the challenge of demanding justice
or winning the king’s favor. In this sense, such khipu-based alphabetic records
allow us to re-embed cacique legal activism in the social and political contexts
in which these indigenous communities litigated.
To begin, the 1570 inquest draws a fundamental distinction between two
categories of pleitos: private and communal. This classification rested on the
nature of the court case and the origin of the resources that sustained the legal
effort, that is, the circumstances under which native leaders had requested,
generated, and administered the surplus to be spent in the courtroom. The
native lords of Jauja explained that they had sometimes engaged in pleitos
particulares (private lawsuits) filed by certain lords (or by their subjects against
them) in local and viceregal courts of justice, usually with the aid of Spanish
advocates and attorneys. The caciques involved as individual plaintiffs or
defendants in these private or individual lawsuits had been expected to fund
their legal activities from their own hacienda privada or private estate.16 Pleitos
15. For the multiple other uses of khipu, see Brokaw, A History; and Gary Urton, Signs of the Inka Khipu:
Binary Coding in the Andean Knotted-String Records (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003).
16. The existence of the caciques’ hacienda privada speaks already of the privatization of communal resources
during the decades between the Spanish Conquest and Toledo’s general inspection of the 1570s. At some point, these
haciendas privadas claimed by the caciques must have been communally controlled. In the case of the Apoalaya lineage,
the paramount lords of Ananguanca, royal grants of indigenous retainers or yanaconas—two hundred to be precise—
can be traced back to the 1540s. Autos que presento´ en este Superior Gobierno el Procurador Salvador Gero´nimo de
Portalanza, que contienen el fraude y engan˜o con que se introdujeron los Astucuris y Limayllas [. . .], 1776. Biblioteca
Nacional del Peru´ [BNP], Manuscritos [Mss.], C2578, fol. 51v. See also the discussion offered in Medelius and De la
Puente Luna, “Curacas, bienes y quipus.”
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del comu´n (communal lawsuits), on the other hand, had been classified and
handled differently. Andean lords had pursued these legal affairs on behalf of
their subjects, sometimes litigating against other Huanca paramount lords or
neighboring ayllus, in Jauja and beyond. Ayllus had financed these legal actions
through the sale of communal holdings, including cattle, cloth, and baskets
of coca, having kept this legal fund as “secret” as possible, that is, undeclared
and outside the control of local Spanish magistrates, at least until the arrival of
Viceroy Toledo in Jauja.17
Since the early 1560s, for instance, don Carlos Apoalaya, chief lord of
Ananguanca, had pursued a series of court cases in Lima to the great hardship
of his family: the effort had cost the lives of his father and fourteen of his close
relatives. These endeavors also cost the Apoalaya clan more than 21,000 pesos
of the family estate, including gold, silver, fine clothes, horses, cattle, and slaves.
The Apoalaya lineage invested these private resources in seeking confirmation
of its noble status and exemption from tribute and labor drafts, in defense
of its cacicazgo rights from aspiring nobles, and in securing the allotment of
the goods and retainers that went along with the title of cacique principal.
Despite his evident frustration with the elevated costs of seeking “justice”
and defending noble rank, don Carlos Apoalaya was careful to distinguish his
private court cases—those involving him, his father, and his paternal uncles—
from the communal lawsuits in which the ayllus of his repartimiento were the
plaintiffs. On some of these occasions, lesser-ranking lords had in fact litigated
or petitioned in the name of the kinship groups of Ananguanca and against the
labor and tribute demands of the Apoalayas, questioning the legitimacy of their
claims. In these cases, they had covered the expenses with the sale of collective
assets, carefully inscribing these transactions on khipus. Don Carlos ultimately
prevailed in maintaining his chiefly status and passing the office onto his direct
descendants. Unlike the caciques of lower rank who were his subordinates,
however, the cacique principal did not rely on the string devices to keep track
of his legal expenses.18
Legal initiatives among the neighboring Luringuancas between the early 1550s
and the late 1560s further illustrate this basic distinction between pleitos that
concerned certain lords and pleitos that, although brought before the courts by
17. Don Francisco de la Guerra y Ce´spedes, former corregidor (chief magistrate) of Jauja, recalled in 1566, “se
fue este don Felipe [Guacrapaucar] a Espan˜a no se acuerda este que declara si fue por delitos o enviado de los hermanos
lo que se aquerda es que le auian dado ciertos dineros de las comunidades que los yndios y cac¸iques tenian secretas
y que se los pedian por los rrecaudos que auia dexado.” Causa con Don Francisco Guacrapaucar y Francisco Ticsi
Cangaguala sobre el cacicazgo de segunda persona del repartimiento de Luringuanca, 1600–1602. Lilly Library, Latin
American Manuscripts–Peru, fol. 10v.
18. Ynformac¸io´n hecha por mandado, AGI, Lima 28A, 63Q, fols. 3r–7v, 11r–15r. Some of these same mid-
ranking caciques also faced the Apoalayas in the courtrooms individually, funding their lawsuits with their family wealth.
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caciques, called for the involvement of the repartimiento as a whole. DonCarlos
Limaylla, paramount lord of Luringuanca, also had to defend himself against
the legal attacks of subordinate caciques. Yet, he also spent a considerable
number of pesos, which he and his accountants registered on khipus, to pay
for the lawsuits in which he represented his group (“en nombre de todos los
indios de su repartimiento”) against other repartimientos, Spanish miners and
encomenderos, and some of the fiscal and labor demands of the Crown.19 Don
Carlos’s records listed, for example, one pleito to lower the tribute quota paid
by the Luringuancas to their encomendero. Another one had been filed to
exempt native tributaries from working in nearby silver mines. Yet another
lawsuit was filed to prevent the Luringuanca tributaries from serving in the
Lima and Huamanga labor markets as well as in the way stations located along
these commercial routes. A fourth court procedure had been brought by don
Carlos to counter certain accusations of sedition against the people and caciques
of Luringuanca. When don Carlos fell sick as a result of his constant trips to
and from Lima, three ayllus covered his medical expenses. The parcialidades
of Luringuanca even contributed a number of Indian porters, messengers, and
retainers, whom they placed at the service of don Carlos Limaylla and other
legal representatives journeying to the viceregal court and the audiencia.20
The “paper khipus” of Jauja offer interesting clues as to how household and
ayllu contributions to each of the repartimientos’ legal funds were parceled
out, thus offering the first insight into the material bases and internal processes
involved in the second category of lawsuits, the pleitos del comu´n.21 The 1570
testimony shows that indigenous stewards and cord masters did not divide the
contributions in kind and labor equally among the different descent groups
that participated in the intertwined processes of planning, collecting, and
accounting. Instead, they assigned each ayllu’s quota on the basis of fractions or
percentages that mirrored its wealth and, especially, its population size—both
a reflection of the precedence of each of these segments within a ranked order.
In apportioning these contributions, the nature and scope of the legal issue at
19. It was Don Carlos’s father, the old cacique Jero´nimo Guacrapaucar, who showed the khipus of Luringuanca
to Pedro Cieza de Leo´n in 1549. Medelius and De la Puente Luna, “Curacas, bienes y quipus,” p. 63.
20. Ynformac¸io´n hecha por mandado, AGI, Lima 28A, 63Q, fols. 2v–3v, 7r–8v. The ayllus of Luringuanca also
litigated among themselves. According to don Carlos Limaylla, the caciques of his repartimiento “an tratado unos con
otros [pleitos] sobre tierras y sobre casas y sobre otras cosas.” Information on a court case over boundaries between
Atunjauja and Luringuanca can be found in Tı´tulos del deslinde y amojonamiento que divide las jurisdicciones de los
dos repartimientos de Jauja y Luringuanca aprobado por el excelentı´simo sen˜or don Francisco de Toledo, 1570–1594,
Archivo Regional de Junı´n [ARJ], Protocolos Notariales [PN], 19, fols. 554r–588r.
21. On household and suprahousehold spheres of production in Central Andean peasant economies, see David
Guillet, “Agrarian Ecology and Peasant Production in the Central Andes,” Mountain Research and Development 1:1
(1981), pp. 19–28; and Enrique Mayer, The Articulated Peasant: Household Economies in the Andes (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 2002). For examples of the use of Andean notions about chuta or trecho for parceling collective tasks
among ayllu and ayllu members, see Frank Salomon and Mercedes Niño-Murcia, The Lettered Mountain: A Peruvian
Village’s Way with Writing (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 141.
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hand, that is, whether the matter pertained to a specific segment such as an
ayllu or group of ayllus or to the whole ethnic polity, seems to have also played
a role.
Khipus, in combination with corn seeds and pebbles of different sizes
and colors, were especially suited to the task of dividing these obligations
proportionately and adding them up later for accounting and auditing
purposes. Grains and stones were moved around, sometimes on boards
(yupanas) and sometimes on the ground, in order to calculate how much each
ayllu had to give or pay. Through the manipulation of these tokens and some
basic arithmetic operations, caciques, stewards, and cord keepers were able to
“balance” their accounts, proportionally allocating each ayllu’s share of the legal
fund and accounting for the contribution later. Tasks and tributes, both paid
and due, were recorded on knotted strings.22 As the royal magistrate Polo de
Ondegardo explained in 1571, the Indians in assigning these duties “still follow
the old order, considering the possibilities of the people and the wealth of the
province in question.”23
Consequently, to fund the Atlantic journey of one of their caciques to the
Spanish court in 1562, the five ayllus of Mataguasi and Marivilca were asked
to produce a total of 30 pesos in gold. The lords and cord masters operating
at the ayllu level employed the procedures described above and came up with
proportional (not equal) shares. One ayllu contributed ten gold pesos, while
the others gave smaller quantities, ranging from four to six pesos each, as their
khipus revealed a few years later.24 The 1570 inquest reveals that the same basic
22. The practice of using khipus in conjunction with pebbles and corn seeds has been documented for different
regions of the Andes. See among others the testimonies of ́ Jose´ de Acosta, Natural and Moral History of the Indies
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 344; and Garcilaso Inca de la Vega, Royal Commentaries of the Incas, and
General History of Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966), p. 124.
23. “e ansi en la destribuc¸ion siempre guardaron la horden de antes, considerado la posivilidad de la gente e
hac¸ienda de la mysma provinc¸ia.” Polo de Ondegardo, “Relacion de los fundamentos acerca del notable dan˜o que
resulta de no guardar a´ los indios sus fueros, in Coleccio´n de documentos ine´ditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y
organizacio´n de las antiguas posesiones espan˜olas de Ame´rica y Oceanı´a” (Madrid: Imp. del Hospicio, 1872 [1571]), pp.
5–177, p. 112. In the 1570s, the caciques and chinukamana (the Aymara equivalent of the khipukamayoq) of Sacaca,
in Charcas, also relied on pebbles and corn kernels to decode their tributary khipus, using these tokens to add up the
partial contributions of each of the parcialidades. Carlos Sempat Assadourian, “String Registries: Native Accounting
andMemory According to the Colonial Sources,” inNarrative Threads, Jeffrey Quilter and Gary Urton, eds., pp. 119–
150; Lydia Fossa, “Two Khipu, One Narrative: Answering Urton’s Questions,” Ethnohistory 47:2 (2000), pp. 453–
468; Platt, “‘Without Deceit or Lies’“; Urton, “From Knots to Narratives.” A decade later, the native communities
of Lucanas, in the Huamanga region, followed the same procedure in a lawsuit against the local magistrate. Marco
Curatola Petrocchi and Jose´ Carlos de la Puente Luna, “Contar concertando: quipus, piedritas y escritura en los Andes
coloniales,” in El quipu colonial, Curatola Petrocchi and De la Puente Luna, eds. (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica
del Peru´, 2013), pp. 193–243.
24. Residencia tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, alcalde del crimen de la Audiencia de Lima, del tiempo
que fue corregidor de la ciudad de Cuzco y visitador de las provincias del Peru´, por el licenciado Pedro Sa´nchez de
Paredes, oidor de la misma Audiencia, 1575, AGI, Justicia, 463, fols. 239v–240r. Don Juan Hananpicho testified, “asi
se juntaron de un ayllo quatro pesos y de otro seis como le cupieron” (my emphasis). Andre´s Chirinos Rivera’s detailed
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principles were at play at the repartimiento level. Each ayllu’s contribution to
the legal fund, whether cattle, baskets of coca, pieces of cloth, or cash, was
assessed and assigned proportionately, according to internal notions of wealth,
value, and fairness.25
Thus, by the mid-sixteenth century, Andean groups like the Huancas of Jauja
had already adapted internal mechanisms previously employed for the control
of labor and the fulfillment of tributary and labor-service obligations to meet
the new requirements and challenges inherent in prosecuting community-wide
pleitos before local and metropolitan courts. By 1570, the Huanca authorities
were handling them as they had handled tributary duties at least since Inca
times, allocating responsibilities to support litigation and build the temporal
legal funds it required, as they had apportioned quotas of labor and kind among
the different corporate descent groups—that is, proportionately and with the
aid of khipus and tokens.
PLANNING, PERFORMANCE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The use of khipus to record legal expenditures among the ayllus of Jauja
reveals additional principles associated with large-scale communal litigation.
Native elites and commoners understood concerted legal action according to
general norms governing the ways caciques should be held accountable by
their communities. Up to this time, the performance of native authorities who
became involved in these court cases was still subject to internal auditing.
In other words, the legal initiatives in which they had taken part, or would
take part, were publicly assessed as part of this process. In his ethnography
of the patrimonial khipus of Tupicocha, a central Andean village located to
the west of the Jauja valley, Frank Salomon has suggested that until the very
recent past knotted strings articulated kinship organization at the ayllu level
with the larger, multi-ayllu sphere of the town, the parcialidad, or the ethnic
analysis of the famous contributions of the Huanca lords to the Spaniards between 1532 and 1554 demonstrates that
each repartimiento supplied goods and tributaries to the invaders on the basis of the same principle, though on a
much larger scale. The share contributed by each repartimiento represented a part of a whole (in this case, the former
Inca fiscal-administrative unit), expressed in fractions such as 2/9, 3/9, and 4/9. Moreover, the ratios that represented
each of these shares varied according to changes in the native population during these turbulent years. Andrés Chirinos
Rivera, Quipus del Tahuantinsuyo: curacas, Incas y su saber matemático en el siglo XVI (Lima: Comentarios, 2010), pp.
21–68. Licentiate Polo Ondegardo explained the decimal rationale behind this procedure. Based on his observations
among the natives of Paria, in the predominantly Aymara-speaking region of Charcas, Ondegardo emphasized the
nature of the distribution: “los repartimientos, las provincias y el reino, estaba divido por cotas partes, de manera que
si a una provincia le cabı´an diez, luego sabı´a cada parcialidad si era se´ptima o quinta o de´cima parte, con lo que habı´a
de acudir y la misma orden guardan hoy en la divisio´n del tributo de un repartimiento.” Ondegardo, “Relacion de los
fundamentos,” p. 113.
25. See the declarations of the mid-ranking caciques of Ananguanca, leaders of the ayllus of the repartimiento.
Ynformac¸io´n hecha por mandado, AGI, Lima 28A, 63Q, fols. 10r–11v.
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group. For centuries, the Tupicochan ayllus have controlled community fields,
pastures, and herds, along with related infrastructure—canals, terrace walls,
and reservoirs—as part of their shared endowment. Control and accounting
of the collective labor that generated these corporately owned resources was,
according to Salomon, the “single most important ingredient” of khipu content
in Tupicocha. The fulfillment of these coordinated duties is still a matter of
high intra- and inter-ayllu politics because it calls for meticulous planning and
recordkeeping by the different parcialidades. Although records of community
herds, tribute quotas, work levied on ayllu members, and the disposition of
goods made with communal resources have been kept in village record books
since the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, they were once registered
on knotted cords such as the ones displayed by the ethnic authorities of Jauja
in 1570.26
Salomon’s findings about the “modern life” of the Tupicochan khipus shed
important light on the early colonial legal actions of the Huanca groups,
as they were recorded on their multiple knotted strings. The khipus of
Tupicocha were versatile devices capable of both simulating and documenting
collective action, allowing communities to contrast previous planning against
actual performance, respectively. In the words of Salomon, khipus were “an
assembly of movable parts” that could be operated in order to weigh group
or individual assigned responsibility to actual performance of duty. For that
reason, khipus mimicked or encoded social and economic domains, such as
inventorying, accounting, attendance taking, calendaring, and quota assigning
and fulfillment. In all of these spheres, the coordination and reconciliation
of planning and performance through public auditing—and thus the social
achievement of inter-ayllu integration—was the ultimate goal. Khipus were,
from this perspective, “a simulation or mimetic device used to represent
changing properties and problems of ayllu and community.”27 Tupicocha,
the location of Salomon’s fieldwork, was part of the colonial province of
Huarochirı´, immediately to the west of the Jauja province. In Huarochirı´, in
part because of Inca and Spanish policies, Andean communities shared many
structural similarities with the communities of Jauja. The historical experience
of these native polities shows that local and metropolitan litigation constituted
26. Salomon, The Cord Keepers, pp. 39, 44–47, 49; Salomon and Nin ̃o-Murcia, The Lettered Mountain, p. 141.
As these authors point out, inter-ayllu responsibilities include annual community-wide canal cleanings, pasture-wall
work, and construction of community halls. For the present-day ayllu books of Tupicocha, see ibid. Available collections
of “khipu-documents” make it abundantly clear that Salomon’s observations about the relationship between khipus
and the control of communal labor are not limited to the Tupicocha region. Marco Curatola Petrocchi and Jose´ Carlos
de la Puente Luna, eds., El quipu colonial: estudios y materiales (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica del Peru´, 2013);
Martti Pa¨rssinen and Jukka Kiviharju, Textos andinos: corpus de textos khipu incaicos y coloniales 2 vols.(Madrid: Instituto
Iberoamericano de Finlandia y Universidad Complutense, 2004–2010).
27. Salomon, The Cord Keepers, pp. 3–7, 16–21, 35–36, 168, 188.
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one of the collective “problems” to which Salomon refers. The lords and
cord keepers of Jauja registered their pleitos on khipus because litigating and
favor-seeking in royal tribunals embodied analogous processes of planning and
performance on the part of the native lords, mid-ranking authorities, and their
tribute-paying subjects.
Don Carlos Limaylla explained in 1570 that the ayllus under his rule had
contributed a total of 7,070 gold pesos for the journey to Spain of his brother
don Felipe Guacrapaucar. In the previous years, don Felipe had been actively
involved in the preparation of probanzas (proofs of merit and service) that
documented the contributions of the Luringuanca ayllus during the conquest
and “pacification” of the Andes. Guacrapaucar reached the royal court in 1562.
For several months prior to his return to Jauja in 1564, don Felipe campaigned
to secure royal decrees instructing the audiencia to hear the natives’ complaints
on several issues, some of them related to the protection of communal land
and cattle and the defense of political autonomy vis-a`-vis Spanish officials and
encomenderos. To raise the money needed to pay for this legal enterprise,
and following the system of proportional allocations explored in the previous
section, the different ayllus of Luringuanca sold livestock, coca, maize, and
other communal assets before and after don Felipe’s voyage, meticulously
recording these transactions on their khipus.28
Don Felipe’s journey to the royal court in Spain is important for understanding
indigenous litigation as it related to the self-auditing mechanisms described by
Salomon for Tupicocha. Some authorities in the communities of Luringuanca
held don Felipe partially accountable for the legal and administrative expenses
that he incurred during his transatlantic journey. In 1566, some caciques and
cord keepers complained to the Spanish local magistrate that, in light of the
tangible outcome of this affair, they had concluded that don Felipe had received
money in excess. The cacique had promised to obtain a royal decree excusing
the natives of his repartimiento from tribute obligations, for example, but this
royal concession did not materialize. Therefore, some of the caciques argued, it
was only fair that a portion of the original contribution be returned to the ayllus
that they represented. Some native authorities also questioned don Felipe’s
securing of a coat of arms, a perpetual pension, and a plot of land while in
Spain, all royal favors perceived to benefit the cacique and his immediate kin
28. Ynformac¸io´n hecha por mandado, AGI, Lima 28A, 63Q, fols. 3v–5r, 9r–9v. According to don Antonio
C¸uniguacra, head of a thousand households (cacique de guaranga) in Luringuanca, “quando don Felipe fue a Espan˜a
a sus negocios, quando bolbio´ le dieron c¸iento e quarenta y c¸inco pesos de los bienes de la comunidad, bendiendo el
ganado y coca e mayz e otros bienes della para los gastar en lo que dicho tiene e para dar a letrados e procuradores,
escrivanos por los dichos pleitos.” In funding their own pleitos, the ayllus of Atunjauja followed a similar procedure.
On the journey of don Felipe Guacrapaucar, see Espinoza Soriano, “Los huancas”; and Mumford, “Aristocracy.”
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directly, as opposed to enhancing the welfare of the Luringuanca peoples that
don Felipe was expected to represent.
More specifically, the aggrieved party pointed out that some of the money given
to don Felipe, around 1,000 pesos, had been spent in purchasing merchandise
that was later sold in Peru, allegedly for private gain (through the cacique’s
business associate), a charge that Guacrapaucar always denied.29 To prove
their case, the Indian officials displayed their khipus before the magistrate
and declared the amount of money tendered by each of their ayllus. These
authorities of the parcialidad level were careful to note that the funds they gave
to don Felipe were not the property of any particular cacique or individual
but belonged “to the community” (“este dinero es de la comunidad”), thus
pointing toward another central aspect of sixteenth-century indigenous legal
activism and social mediation to which we now turn.30
LITIGATION AS SAPCI
The voices of these Huanca lords, though very rich in their implications, come
to us through the words of an interpreter assigned to the 1570 inquest.31
This level of mediation hinders our understanding of the original concepts
introduced by the caciques in the native language, the Central Quechua dialect
spoken by the native people of the valley. Nonetheless, an important clue about
the categories and principles that the officials of Toledo’s staff were translating
comes from the sworn statement of don Pedro Yaldama, chief accountant and
khipu master of the town of Mataguasi, in Luringuanca. In 1566, along with
other authorities and cord keepers like himself, Yaldama testified against don
Felipe Guacrapaucar, the lord who stayed at the Habsburg court between
1562 and 1564. Yaldama declared, through the words of a Spanish-Quechua
29. In the trial of Don Felipe, his political enemies claimed that the reason behind this journey and other
legal actions was to extort a “gran cantidad de pesos de oro y ganado” from the communal endowment. Yet, Don
Felipe countered these accusations, denouncing his brother don Carlos Limaylla instead. Don Felipe claimed that this
animosity stemmed from his defense of communal herds. Residencia tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, fol. 238r.
30. Ibid., fols. 237v–40r. Don Juan Hananpicho, a principal from the town of Mataguasi, declared with the aid
of an interpreter that “este dinero es de la comunidad y que no se le a buelto,” asking that justice be met by returning
it to the communal fund. The modern khipus of Tupicocha studied by Frank Salomon figure prominently in similar
audit procedures. Khipus are displayed during the annual civic meeting or huayrona, when “citizens hold outgoing
officers responsible for the past year’s work.” These authorities must face the public, be questioned, and hand over
the current expense fund and the welfare-ritual fund to the newly elected officials. Conversely, the officials “had the
right to call out ayllus as teams to accomplish tasks on the larger, community-wide infrastructure.” Salomon, The Cord
Keepers, pp. 138, 186, 197–199.
31. Pedro Xua´rez de Carvajal acted as official interpreter during the 1570 investigation. Ynformac¸io´n hecha por
mandado, AGI, Lima 28A, 63Q, fol. 2v. The caciques and cord keepers who testified in the subsequent trial against
Bartolome´ Ruiz, don Felipe Guacrapaucar’s associate, relied on the interpretation of Alonso Herna´ndez. Residencia
tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, fols. 239v–240r.
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interpreter, that the money given to Guacrapaucar to fund the journey to Spain
proceeded from the sale of coca, cattle, and cloth that belonged to “los pobres
y comunidad.”32 In this context, “los pobres”—literally “the poor”—must be
understood as referring to those in need of help and support from the other
members of their ayllu.33 Although the document does not elaborate on the
original expression used by Yaldama, the chronicler Felipe Guaman Poma de
Ayala comes to our aid for the purpose of identifying the ideas presented by
the accountant and the native leaders who would declare four years later before
Viceroy Toledo’s officials.
To the imaginary question—put forth by no other than King Philip himself—
as to how the Indians of the kingdom would enrich themselves and prosper,
Guaman Poma replied, “I should let Your Majesty know that they must
have hacienda de comunidad, which they call sapci.”34 As John Murra noted,
Guaman Poma applied the notion or “law” of sapci to three strategic resources:
foodstuffs, herds, and textiles.35 Frank Salomon has recently built on Murra’s
insights, noting that by the early seventeenth century the term sapci was also
being applied to the community welfare deposits (collcas), which Guaman Poma
accurately defines as “depocito de la comunidad y sapci.” As the model of the
nucleated village was implemented in the Andes in the 1560s and 1570s, these
storehouses came to be part of the architectural complex that native authorities
would devote to the administration of intra-communal holdings. The notion
of sapci, symbolized by the colonial collca, came to encompass a productive
base—specifically, an agricultural field or herd—the amount of collective labor
32. Residencia tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, fol. 240v.
33. In the late 1560s, the licentiate Francisco Falco´n, a prominent lawyer with a large indigenous clientele,
explained this concept to his Spanish audience: “los indios comunes que no tenian cargo ni oficio, los cuales partian
entre sı´ por rayas que ellos llaman suyo, lo que a´ cada uno, sus hijos y muger y gente de su casa para que le ayudasen,
y el que tenia muchos que le ayudasen, acababa presto, y este se llamaba hombre rico. Y el que no tenia quien le
ayudase era pobre y estaba ma´s tiempo trabajando.” Francisco Falco´n, “Representacio´n hecha por el licenciado Falco´n
en concilio provincial, sobre los dan˜os y molestias que se hacen a´ los indios,” in Coleccio´n de documentos ine´ditos,
relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organizacio´n de las antiguas posesiones espan˜olas de Ame´rica y Oceanı´a (Madrid:
Imp. de Frı´as y Compan˜ı´a, 1867 [c. 1567]), pp. 451–495, p. 470.
34. “Dime, autor, ¿co´mo se hara´ rrico los yndios? A de sauer vuestra Magestad que an de tener hazienda
de comunidad que ellos les llama sapci.” Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, El primer nueva coro´nica y buen gobierno.
Digital facsimile of the original manuscript (Copenhagen: The Royal Library of Denmark, 1615–16), p. 977
http://www.kb.dk/permalink/2006/poma/info/en/frontpage.htm, accessed October 6, 2104. Juan de Santa Cruz
Pachacuti’s Relacio´n de antigu¨edades deste reino del Peru´ also documents the use of sapci in the early seventeenth
century. According to the chronicler, Tupac Inca Yupanqui ordered that, in each parcialidad, “obiesen comunidades
y sapssi para el prouecho y sustento de los pobres, que son llamas y comidas.” Juan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui
Salcamaygua, “Relacio´n de antigu¨edades deste reino del Peru´,” in Antigu¨edades del Peru´, Henrique Urbano and Ana
Sa´nchez, eds. (Madrid: Historia 16, 1992), pp. 171–269, p. 232.
35. John V. Murra, “Waman Puma, etno´grafo del mundo andino,” in Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, El primer
nueva coro´nica y buen gobierno, Rolena Adorno, John V. Murra, and Jorge Urioste, eds. (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno,
1992), pp. xiii–xix, p. xv.
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applied to it, and the infrastructure and technologies needed to count, store,
and use these resources (in this case, khipus and storehouses).36
Clearly then, Guaman Poma described a widespread regime of production,
consumption, and accumulation under the category of sapci, a system that
operated above and beyond the household and ayllu subsistence levels. Its main
purpose was to generate a “contingency” or “welfare” surplus fund that could
be used in multiple contexts. In different passages of theNueva coro´nica y buen
gobierno (1615–1616), Guaman Poma offered examples of the application of
this category, which he frequently glossed as “hacienda de comunidad,” to the
affairs of everyday life in the Andes. In his presentation of the yearly agricultural
cycle, for instance, Guaman Poma, like the Huanca accountant don Pedro
Yaldama before him, linked sapci to “los pobres” of the community. Guaman
Poma explains that May was the period in which native authorities inspected
sapci foodstuffs, maize, potatoes, and the common herds, reprimanding the
stewards of communal assets who had not kept a good and straightforward
account of these goods. This month was also the right time for “filling up the
storehouses of los pobres, so that food is available to them throughout the year
and they never go hungry.”37
July was likewise a time associated with the storage of harvested produce
in these welfare deposits, the counting of common herd animals, and the
redistribution of agricultural plots. During this month, native authorities set
aside a portion of the fruits and vegetables that were not for immediate
consumption. These foodstuffs were then deposited in special facilities, which
Guaman Poma again identified as belonging to “the yndios pobres and
the communities.”38 During July, the chronicler further explained, caciques
36. Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva coro´nica, p. 822; Salomon, The Cord Keepers, pp. 140–141; Salomon,
“Collca y Sapc¸i: una perspectiva sobre el almacenamiento inka desde la analogı´a etnogra´fica,” Boletı´n de Arqueologı´a
PUCP 8 (2005), pp. 43–57; Frank Salomon et al., “Los khipus de Rapaz en casa: un complejo administrativo-
ceremonial centroperuano,” Revista Andina 43 (2006), pp. 59–92. Salomon develops these ideas in a series of
important works devoted to analyzing the connection between ethnographic khipus and the civic and ceremonial
spaces in which they are still found. These “collca/sapci complexes,” as Salomon calls them, are still in use in present-
day highland communities such as Rapaz and Tupicocha (modern department of Lima). Based on the observations of
Guaman Poma and the anonymous author of the “Quechua Manuscript of Huarochirı´,” Salomon convincingly argues
that these civic-religious infrastructures and spaces came into being in the 1570s, precisely the “ethnographic present”
of this article.
37. “En este mes se uecitan las comunidades y sapci del mays y papas y toda la comida y los ganados comunes
y sapci. Y lo castigan, no dando buena cuenta [. . .] se hinche todas las depo´citos y las casas de los pobres [. . .] para
que ayga que comer todo el an˜o, para que no ayga hambre en los pobres en todo el rreyno.” Guaman Poma de Ayala,
Nueva coro´nica, p. 1153.
38. “de los yndios pobres y de las comunidades.” Guaman Poma presents the list of resources that were typically
stored in these deposits (the Quechua term is followed by George Urioste’s Spanish translation in brackets): “harqui
[carne hecha conserva], lana, misquillicoy [mata dulce], mata, pezaca [perdiz grande] c, chaura [llama] d, uicona
[vicun˜a], uanaco [guanaco], quiuyo [pa´jaro], chalua [pescado], cuchucho [pa´jaro], usuta [alpargata], uasca [soga],
apa [frazada], maytocuna [envoltorios], cancaua [yerba acua´tica], lullocha [berro].” Ibid., p. 247.
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inspected the fields as the ayllus were about to embark on a new agricultural
cycle. They redistributed land and water rights among active households and
ayllus, assigning unused lands (tierras ualdias) and water to “the poor.” The
caciques were to make sure that, even if these people could not work the
plots themselves, others would farm them “for the community and sapci,”
thus fulfilling a basic social obligation. These fields, Guaman Poma explained,
received the name of “sapci chacara.” The produce of these collective plots was
to be redistributed during times of low agricultural productivity.39 Ideally, then,
sapci funds were the output of the able-bodied members of the different ayllus,
and therefore “that which belongs to all.”40
“Los pobres” of Guaman Poma’s Nueva coro´nica y buen gobierno constituted
a broad social category that included different classes of people: individuals
who could not rely on their immediate kin (for example, orphans and widows),
men and women who had already served their community (biejos pasados), and
people who were “impeded” from serving (impedidos), such as the sick and
the handicapped. According to the indigenous chronicler, these individuals
should be exempted (reservados) from their share of tributary duties, which
should in turn be covered by funds drawn from the “comonidad y sapci.”41 A
39. “IVLIO, CHACRA CONAcuy Quilla: En este mes se llama aymoray quilla, que se a de rrecogerse todas
las comidas y frutas pasadas y uerduras secas, cacha, yuyo y metellos en los depo´citos y despensas de los yndios
pobres y de las comunidades y de los caciques principales en todo el rreyno.” Ibid., p. 1159. In an earlier passage,
Guaman Poma explains the events of July: “IVLIO, Chacra Conacuy: Quen este mes becitauan las dichas sementeras
y chacaras y rrepartı´an a los pobres de las dichas chacaras que sobrauan; las dichas ualdı´as y rrealengas lo senbrauan
para la comunidad y sapci.” Ibid., p. 251. Further references to the sapci chacara, which George Urioste translates
as “sementera de la comunidad” (community fields for planting) can be found in ibid., p. 911. Diego Gonza´lez
Holguı´n glosses sapsichacra as “la de la comunidad.” Gonza´lez Holguı´n, Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el
Perú llamada lengua qquichua, o del Inca (Lima: Francisco del Canto, 1608), p. 323. In a series of pioneering articles,
JohnMurra opened an exploration of the crucial distinction between sapci lands and other types of chacaras in an effort
to understand the different regimes of access to agricultural resources that coexisted in the Andes. Murra, “Derechos
a las tierras en el Tawantinsuyu,” Revista de la Universidad Complutense 28:117 (1980), pp. 273–287; “Una vision
indigena del mundo andino,” in Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva cro´nica y buen gobierno, Rolena Adorno, John
V. Murra, and Jorge Urioste, eds. (Madrid: Historia 16, 1987), pp. il–lxiii; “Waman Puma, etno´grafo del mundo
andino”.
40. Diego Gonza´lez Holguı´n defines sapci as “cosa comun de todos” and “Lauor comun de todos[;] obra de
comunidad.” Gonza ́lez Holguín, Vocabulario, p. 323, 333. Gonza´lez Holguı´n’s vocabulary also includes the following
entry: “sapsi ymampas o caquenpas: Los bienes o lo que es de comunidad,” in ibid., p. 323. It is important to note
that Gonza´lez Holguı´n’s work is concerned with the Southern Quechua dialect and not necessarily with the Central
Quechua dialect spoken in the Jauja valley. Juan de Matienzo writes about sapci, “Lo que cabe a la comunidad es
para ellos mesmos, pues de ello se han de sustentar las necesidades comunes, los pobres, y el hospital.” Matienzo,
Gobierno del Peru´ con todas las cosas pertenecientes a e´l y a su historia (Paris: Ministe´re des Affaires E´trange´res, 1967),
p. 61. References to the central contributions of female workers of different age groups to the “comonidad y sapci”
can be found in Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva coro´nica, pp. 910, 977. For the contributions of elders, widows,
single women, and orphans to their “comunidades y sapci,” see ibid., p. 449. Also relevant is the classic study of John
Rowe on the workings and age-grade categories of the Inca census. Rowe, “The Age-Grades of the Inca Census,”
in Miscellanea Paul Rivet octogenario didacta, Pablo Martı´nez del Rı´o and P. Bosch-Gimpera, eds. (Mexico: UNAM,
1958), pp. 499–522.
41. Regarding those who were reserved from full-time work, Guaman Poma writes, “que no eche derrama
entre los biejos pasados ni biudas ni solteras en este rreyno. [. . .] Y estos dichos enfermos enpedidos sean rreseruados,
conforme la merced y se´dula rreal de su Magestad. So´lo que ayude las comunidades y sapci y lo de la yglecia y cofrades
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seventeenth-century census of certain ayllus of Jauja shows the vitality of these
social categories. Each ayllu, irrespective of the town in which its members
had been relocated, still classified its tributary population as active (efectivos),
retired or no longer tributary (pasados de tasa), deceased (muertos), and absent
(ausentes).42
In sum, sapci funds and endowments, unlike other private and collective
resources, could be enjoyed by inactive or disabled community members, those
who, because of their age or some other permanent or temporary circumstance,
could not be involved full time in the production process (as farmers, weavers,
or herders, for instance). They were, however, expected to contribute to the
reproduction of sapci resources or with other productive and ritual activities
according to their age and possibilities.43 In a way, even the dead—tributaries
who, though no longer living, were still listed as such in the official rolls—
had access to these funds. These individuals, and ultimately the community as
a whole, had the right to benefit from Guaman Poma’s “comunidad y sapci.”
Sapci was, in ideal terms, that which was for the “common good” of the group.
The planning and funding of community-wide litigation fell under the category
of comunidad y sapci. As such, it was governed by the social norms outlined
above. In his admonitions to King Philip, Guaman Poma listed mills, vineyards,
textile workshops, tanneries, and even liens (censos) on real estate as examples of
communal endowments administered according to this regime, showing that
native communities and their legal intermediaries had successfully adapted and
expanded this traditional law to the new colonial order.44 Native authorities
[. . .] seruicio de Dios nuestro sen˜or Jesucristo y seruicio de su Magestad y bien de los pobres yndios en este rreyno.”
Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva coro´nica, p. 884. In a related passage, Guaman Poma states, “Y ancı´ con esta dicha
comonidad y sapci se a de pagar la taza de los enfermos y no de otra persona,” in ibid., p. 910. See also one of the
“laws” presented by Garcilaso as having been compiled by Father Blas Valera from ancient khipu records: “The law and
favor of the so-called poor required that the blind, dumb, lame, and paralyzed, the aged and infirm, chronic invalids,
and others who were unable to till the soil and feed and clothe themselves by their own labors should be maintained
from the public stores.” Garcilaso de la Vega, Royal Commentaries, p. 263.
42. “Expediente sobre el juicio de residencia instaurado por el capita´n Pedro de Vega al Maestre de Campo
Diego de Escobar Osorio, corregidor y justicia mayor que fue de Jauja,” 1644, BNP, Mss., B1482, fols. 305r–310v.
43. In 1613, the three repartimientos of Jauja were collecting funds from the Caja General de Censos in Lima
to pay for “los enfermos y por los muertos que no enteran los tributarios de la Rebisita.” Testimonio de los 500
pesos de a 8 reales que el sen˜or don Lope de Torres y Guzman corregidor de Xauxa pago a don Cristo´bal Pomaricra
administrador de la comunidad del Repartimiento de Atunxauxa, 1613, AGN, Caja General de Censos, Leg. 4, Doc.
21. In 1666, don Carlos Apoalaya, cacique principal of Ananguanca and a direct descendant of the namesake who
declared before Toledo’s officials in 1570, gave power of attorney to a Spaniard to collect 4,752 pesos from the Caja
General de Censos de Indios of Lima, “por ssi y en nombre de los yndios pobres del dicho repartimiento.” The origin
of these funds went back to a sixteenth-century endowment “para el socorro de los yndios pobres tributarios.” Carta
de poder del Gouernador Pedro de Garay y otro al Cap. Francisco de Jauregi, February 13, 1666. ARJ, PN, 9, fols.
597r–597v.
44. “sementeras de may´s y trigo, papas, agı´, magno [verdura seca], algodo´n, uin˜a, obrage, ten˜irı´a, coca, frutales.
[. . .] Y tengan ganados de Castilla y de la tierra de su comunidad y sapci.” Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva coro´nica,
p. 977. “Y para este efecto, todas las uillas, aldeas y ciudades arrienden tierras de los yndios cada an˜o. Para arrendalle,
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and ayllus planning to engage with the court system supplemented sapci funds
(pesos obtained through the sale of cattle, cloth, maize, and coca), with regular
and extraordinary levies of collective labor and goods, the last of which the
documents often call derramas.45
Just as importantly, litigating caciques were expected to reciprocate or give back
to the ayllus, by obtaining rulings, royal decrees, and other grants and favors
for the group. Beneficiaries at the household and ayllu levels were also expected
to reciprocate. In the case of the caciques, any money remaining after litigation
expenses were paid should return to the community welfare fund either in cash
or through institutionalized generosity and hospitality on the part of the Indian
leaders, according to well-established rules of reciprocity and redistribution.46
Successful litigation was, from this perspective, the cacique’s contribution to
sapci. Or, as don Felipe Guacrapaucar liked to say when criticizing his brother
before the commoners of Luringuanca, “What kind of cacique is this don Carlos
that he does not seek justice in Lima?”47
In describing their communities’ pleitos of the 1550s and 1560s, the lords
of Jauja pointed toward sapci funds as the essential resource available for
financing costly and lengthy legal cases. In 1570, the official interpreter
glossed the original expression as “bienes del comu´n” or “hacienda de los pobres
y comunidad.” However, the use of the original Quechua term “sapci” in
this context is very likely, as can be inferred from the fact that the term
remained in use until at least the mid-seventeenth century, when it appears
tengan comunidad y sapci como uin˜a, engenio, obrage, sementeras o ganados o rropa o sensos, trapiches,” in ibid., p.
555.
45. Residencia tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, fols. 239v–240r. For similar collections of derramas to pay
for litigation, see Yannakakis, The Art of Being In-Between, pp. 45, 120–121.
46. About derramas and the “institutionalized generosity” expected from caciques in this context, Viceroy
Toledo wrote in the early 1580s, “si el [pleito] que traı´an era del comu´n de los indios, les echaba el cacique
derramas en mucha cantidad con color de que era para su bien, que e´l gastaba y consumı´a en borracheras, presentes e
impertinencias,” Francisco de Toledo, “Memorial que Don Francisco de Toledo dio al Rey Nuestro Sen˜or del estado
en que dejo´ las cosas del Peru´ despue´s de haber sido virrey y capita´n general por trece an˜os, que comenzaron en 1569,”
in Los virreyes espan˜oles en Ame´rica durante el gobierno de la Casa de Austria: Peru´, Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodrı´guez,
eds. (Madrid: Atlas, 1978), pp. 128–149, p. 140. Note that Toledo is referring specifically to communal lawsuits.
47. “que cac¸ique es ese don Carlos que no va a pedir justic¸ia a Lima.” Don Felipe, moreoever, had told his
brother Don Carlos, “not to demand tribute in excess from los yndios pobres because if he did, they would file a
complaint against us [caciques]” (“que no lleue a los yndios pobres mas tributos de los que son obligados porque
sy se los llevan que se quexaran de nosotros”). Residencia tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, fols. 268v, 283v.
The supporters of don Felipe Guacrapaucar would attribute his downfall to the fact that Guacrapaucar “favors only the
pobres of the community, winning decrees from Lima’s High Court of Appeal and preventing Don Carlos [the cacique
principal of Luringuanca, his brother] from charging the yndios pobres more tribute than they are obliged to pay”
(“solamente faboresce a los pobres de la comunydad y gana prouisiones de la Audiencc¸ia rreal e porquel dicho don
Felipe dize al dicho don Carlos que no lleue a los yndios pobres mas tributos de los que son obligados”). Residencia
tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, fol. 268r.
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in Jauja documents.48 Behind this broad term, ayllus, now officially relocated
in Spanish-style towns, operated as the main keepers of this endowment and
the main litigants in the king’s courts.49
THE PRICE OF JUSTICE
Until at least the seventeenth century, the repartimientos of Jauja held
significant sapci endowments. In the 1560s, the Ananguancas had received an
endowment of 8,000 pesos as restitution from Antonio de Ribera, their guilt-
ridden encomendero. The native leaders invested a portion of these funds in
liens, which they placed in real estate in Lima.50 Around the same time, the
ayllus of Luringuanca added a series of similar restitutions and donations of
cattle, vineyards, and houses in Huamanga to their already significant collective
assets. Archbishop Toribio de Mogrovejo’s inspection of the Lima diocese lists
fifty thousand llamas as part of Luringuanca’s common endowment at the end
of the sixteenth century. The Luringuanca ayllus later secured other resources,
especially land from the Crown, the revenues of which, along with those
obtained from the sale of communal cattle, were placed in a series of investments
in Lima and Huamanga. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
the caciques and indigenous officials of the cabildo rented out communal
property and lent hundreds of pesos to different individuals and institutions.
In Huamanga alone, these communal assets were valued at 10,000 pesos in the
mid-seventeenth century.51
48. In 1644, the native authorities of Luringuanca listed, among their “bienes de comunidades,” “algunas
chacaras y sabsis que hasen de comunidad para entregar expec¸ies de tasas” (my emphasis). Expediente sobre el juicio
de residencia, fols. 220v–221r. The use of sapci in connection with community assets and deposits is also documented
for the province of Cajatambo, in the North Central Andes, in the 1650s. Pierre Duviols, ed., Procesos y visitas de
idolatrı´as. Cajatambo, siglo XVII (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica del Peru´ and Instituto France´s de Estudios
Andinos, 2003), pp. 485, 491. I thank Susan Ramirez for pointing out these references to the “comunidades y sapc¸is”
in Cajatambo.
49. In 1657, the caciques of Luringuanca lent 10,000 pesos to a Spanish resident of Huamanga. The notary
who authorized the transaction pointed out that, although the Spaniard legally owed the money to the Luringuanca
repartimiento as a whole, the funds belonged to “the community of each of the towns of the repartimiento”
(“Comunidad de cada vno de los Pueblos del dicho repartimiento”). BNP, Archivo Astete Concha, Z1010 [1651],
fols. 140r–141v.
50. Autos seguidos por el Licenciado Rodrigo de Acosta por si y los demas sus hermanos, hijos y herederos de
Jorge de Acosta difunto contra el Administrador general de esta Caja, sobre que buelua a dichos herederos la Cantidad
de 904 pesos 4 reales que cobro indebidamente de los Bienes del dicho su Padre, 1626, AGN, Caja de Censos, Leg.
10, Doc. 4, fol. 14r–14v.
51. Jose´ Antonio Benito Rodrı´guez, ed., Libro de visitas de Santo ToribioMogrovejo, 1593–1605 (Lima: Pontificia
Universidad Cato ́lica del Perú, 2006), p. 255. For the restitutions made by several encomenderos to the “comunidad
y sapci” of the polities of Jauja, see Espinoza Soriano, “Los huancas,” pp. 393–395; Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva
coro´nica, p. 573; and Guillermo Lohmann Villena, “La restitucio´n por conquistadores y encomenderos: un aspecto
de la incidencia lascasiana en el Peru´,” in Estudios lascasianos: IV centenario de la muerte de fray Bartolome´ de las
Casas (1566–1966) (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1966), pp. 21–89. For the estimated value of
Luringuanca’s communal assets in Huamanga, see Venta que hace la comunidad de indios de Lurin Huancas, de las
tierras de Vin˜aca y Conoc, 1720, BNP, Archivo Astete Concha, Z1010.
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Part of this revenue supplemented the payment in cash and kind of the
repartimiento’s annual tribute, some 9,000 pesos at the turn of the seventeenth
century.52 Yet another portion was designated for financing the community’s
legal affairs in Peru and Spain. After all, according to Toledo’s estimates, the
Luringuanca Indians had spent more than 17,800 pesos in the 1560s alone in
different court cases aired before the audiencia and the Council of the Indies.
Overall, the communities of the valley had spent more than 30,000 pesos of
their communal funds in traveling to the audiencia and in hiring advocates,
attorneys, interpreters, and solicitors (excluding the high number of natives,
more than 600 according to one estimate, who had perished as a result of
the ten-day journey across the Andes).53 To put this amount in perspective,
travelers passing through the valley were supposed to pay a fraction of a peso
for three pounds of bread, a peso for a sheep, and a peso and a half for one and
a half bushels of maize. Just in pleitos pitting caciques against ayllus and their
principales, the communities of Luringuanca had spent 6,800 pesos, roughly
eight and a half times the yearly salary of all the caciques of the repartimiento
around this time.54
As Toledo’s 1570 investigation demonstrated, litigating and soliciting were
expensive activities. The communities of Jauja continued to litigate in Lima
and Spain for a reduction of both their tribute and mita population quotas for
the next 150 years, probably at a very high cost.55 This significant legal activism
cannot be explained without considering the inner workings of sapci resources
52. In 1590, for example, the caciques of Atunjauja declared that they supplemented tribute payments in cash
with the sale of maize and wheat obtained from “una chacara que tienen de comunydad.” The chacra was farmed “a
costa de todos” (at everyone’s expense). Autos promovidos por el Capita´n Don Garcı´a de Paredes y Ulloa, corregidor
y justicia mayor de la provincia de Jauja y su jurisdiccio´n, 1591, AGN, Juicios de Residencia, Leg. 8, Cuad. 21, fols.
28r, 32r. For the amount of tribute paid by the Luringuancas annually, see Antonio Va ́zquez de Espinosa, Compendio
y descripción de las Indias Occidentales (Madrid: Atlas, 1969), p. 457.
53. “letrados procuradores y lenguas y solic¸itadores.” Ynformac¸io´n hecha por mandado, AGI, Lima 28A, 63Q,
fols. 2r, 12r–15r.
54. Aranzel de los mantenimientos que se benden en los tambos, 1569, Archivo del Museo Nacional de
Arqueologı´a, Antropologı´a e Historia [AMNAAH], Mss., 1; Medelius and De la Puente Luna, “Curacas, bienes y
quipus,” p. 48. These expenses do not seem excessive or made-up if one considers that, around the same time, Don˜a
Ana Azarpay Coya, a granddaughter of Atahualpa living in Cuzco, claimed to have spent more than 3,000 pesos in
securing a land grant from the viceroy in Lima. Francisco Sierra de Leguı´zamo, son of a veteran conquistador who
settled in Cuzco, sought the king’s favor at the royal court on two occasions. The alleged costs were 16,000 pesos. At
the close of the seventeenth century, don˜a Ana Marı´a Ferna´ndez Coronel, a Lima resident and like don˜a Ana Azarpay
a descendant of the former Inca rulers, authorized her agents to contract debts of up to 2,000 pesos for representing
her at the Habsburg court. AGN, PN, 1883 [1696], fols. 27v–28r; Udo Oberem, Notas y documentos sobre miembros
de la familia del Inca Atahualpa en el siglo XVI (Guayaquil: Casa de la Cultura Ecuatoriana, 1976), p. 228; Stuart
Stirling, The Last Conquistador: Mansio Serra de Leguizamo´n and the Conquest of the Incas (Stroud, Gloucestershire:
Sutton Publishing, 1999), pp. 182–183.
55. Expediente sobre el juicio de residencia, fol. 241r–241v. During the 1640s and 1650s, the repartimientos
of Jauja continued their legal efforts, this time with a transatlantic scope, to secure royal exoneration from mita duties
at the mercury mines of Huancavelica. In 1646, they empowered a lawyer and former magistrate of the province to
represent them at the royal court. El licenciado Gaspar de Escalona Agu¨ero Procurador general de la Ciudad del Cusco
por los Indios de Xauxa, 1647. AGI, Lima, 25. The Huanca made similar efforts in the next decade.
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and the activities of communal intermediaries who placed them at the service
of litigation. The evidence suggests that other indigenous communities simply
could not afford these initiatives, especially if they entailed journeying to Lima
or Madrid.56 After the implementation of the system of public legal assistance
in the 1570s, legal aides, mainly public defenders and attorneys for the Indians,
were supposed to charge reduced fees or no fees at all, which in reality meant
that many of the informal or extralegal costs of litigation and administrative
procedure never made it into the historical record. Scattered evidence for the
first two centuries of colonial rule shows that the fees and other costs of gaining
access to the justice system did not disappear but were simply not recorded.
In fact, the charging of legal and extralegal fees to indigenous plaintiffs and
petitioners appearing before the audiencia continued throughout the colonial
period.57
The communities of Jauja, perhaps like many other communities throughout
the Andes, spent a significant portion of their sapci funds to “sacar
provisiones”—to obtain favorable rulings from the audiencia and take notarized
copies of them back to the community. As has been stated, the fees of private
attorneys and solicitors, scribes, interpreters, and even witnesses, some of them
apparently paid in kind directly from sapci funds, labor, and lands, only added
to these expenses.58 In the mid 1580s, native plaintiffs appearing before the
audiencia could spend 60 pesos on hiring a private attorney and half that
amount on securing a solicitor for one single court case. Having a petition
drafted in Lima could cost between eight and ten pesos in 1585. In 1620,
56. At the turn of the eighteenth century, the “prinsipales y comun” of the town of Abancay, in the Cuzco
region, complained before a Crown-appointed land inspector that they were too poor to send a delegation to obtain
copies of their original land titles in Lima, which meant that important portions of their community lands were usurped
in practice. AGI, Tı´tulos de Propiedad, Leg. 24, Cuad. 454 [1711–1714], fol. 309r. A much earlier denunciation of
what these legal pilgrimages to Lima meant for litigants of the Southern Andes can be found in Domingo de Santo
Toma´s to the King, December 10, 1563. Archivo Vargas Ugarte (Lima), Vol. 36, Doc. 7, p. 53.
57. See Alcira Duen˜as’s contribution to this issue. In the 1570s, the Crown devised a system of legal protection
and “free” public assistance to channel the judicial actions of native subjects exclusively. InMexico and Peru, the system
included the creation of special courts and jurisdictions and the appointment of public defenders and attorneys for the
Indians. Woodrow W. Borah, “Juzgado General de indios del Peru´ o juzgado particular de indios de El Cercado de
Lima,” Revista Chilena de Historia del Derecho 6 (1970), pp. 129–142; Honores, “La asistencia jurı´dica privada a
los sen˜ores indı´genas ante la Real Audiencia de Lima, 1552–1570”; Honores, “Una sociedad legalista”; Mumford,
“Litigation as Ethnography”; Carmen Ruigo´mez Go´mez, Una polı´tica indigenista de los Habsburgo: el protector de
indios del Peru´ (Madrid: Ediciones de Cultura Hispa´nica, 1988). For New Spain, see Woodrow W. Borah, Justice by
Insurance: The General Indian Court of Colonial Mexico and the Legal Aides of the Half-Real (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1983); Caroline Cunill, Los defensores de indios de Yucata´n y el acceso de los mayas a la justicia colonial,
1540–1600 (Me´rida: UNAM, 2012); Charles R. Cutter, The Protector de Indios in Colonial New Mexico, 1659–1821
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986); and Cutter, The Legal Culture of Northern New Spain, 1700–
1810 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995).
58. Juan Ve´lez, a mestizo interpreter and interim defender of the Indians who, for all intents and purposes,
served as an informal attorney for the Huanca peoples before the Audiencia, claimed to have received lands and “yndios
muchachos de seruic¸io” from the caciques of the Valley, probably in payment for his services. Informac¸ion fecha de
ofic¸io conforme a la rreal cedula de su magestad en la rreal audienc¸ia de los rreyes de los seruic¸ios y meritos de juan
belez ynterprete del gouierno, 1615. AGI, Lima, 145.
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however, one community paid six times that amount to have theirs secretly
delivered all the way to the Council of the Indies. Having the secretariat of
government dispatch a decree could add another 30 pesos. Notaries could also
demand extra legal fees to look up past lawsuits and other papers within their
ledgers.59
In addition to these expenses, native claimants from Jauja and elsewhere traded
fully in the economy of favor and engaged in the patronage networks that
held viceregal and royal courts together, offering bribes, gifts, and “gracious”
or “voluntary” donations (donativos graciosos) to influence judicial decisions
or curry favor with colonial officials, and at times even the king. During the
last three decades of the sixteenth century alone, the communities of Jauja
donated the staggering sum of 200,000 pesos from their community funds
to the Crown, with the hope that, as a royal representative had promised them,
His Majesty would exempt them from mita labor at the mercury mines. The
offer never materialized.60
COMMUNAL STRUCTURES AND LEGAL INTERMEDIARIES
Gaining access to an expensive and cumbersome justice system depended on
the organization of wider structures and the appointing of community agents
for administering sapci holdings and interacting with the courts. Control over
community treasures and endowments was surely a highly contested issue. As
Andeanists know well, cross-complaints of corruption and misappropriation
among priests, corregidores, caciques, and cabildo officials were chronic.
Nonetheless, whenever possible, Andean communities must have relied on
59. Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva coro´nica, p. 526; Oswaldo Holguı´n Callo, Poder, corrupcio´n y tortura en
el Peru´ de Felipe II: el doctor Diego de Salinas (1558–1595), (Lima: Congreso del Peru´, 2002), p. 153. In 1585, the
interpreter-general of the Audiencia noted that, because of these fees, native litigants ended up spending “mas que un
espan˜ol” (more than a Spaniard). AGI, Lima, 127 [1585], fols. 16v–17v. For similar fees charged by defenders for the
Indians and other officials of the audiencias of Quito and Mexico City, see Diana Bonnett, Los protectores de naturales
en la Audiencia de Quito, siglos XVII y XVIII (Quito: FLACSO; Abya-Yala, 1992); Borah, Justice by Insurance, pp.
42–58; and Diana Bonnett, Los protectores de naturales en la Audiencia de Quito, siglos XVII y XVIII (Quito: FLACSO;
Abya-Yala, 1992).
60. A witness of these negotiations between the indigenous leaders and the representatives of the king testified,
“por promesas que les hacia de que Su Magd. Les haria merc¸edes y Les rreserbaria del Seruicio de las minas de sogue
y otras cosas a este modo de suerte que aunque no tenian plata En sus caxas de comunidad hicieron la manda del
ganado que estaua por naser y del maiz Y otras especies questaua por sembrar Y de sus mismas haciendas de manera
que en tres an˜os poco mas o menos pagaron las dichas mandas que hicieron a SuMags. a mucha costa de sus haciendas y
Comunidades.” Informac¸ion fecha de ofic¸io, AGI, Lima, 145, n/fol. Such gifts and donations constituted a widespread
native legal strategy. For examples of bribes and gifts to viceroys, audiencia magistrates, and defenders of the Indians by
caciques and communities in the Collao and Cuzco regions, see Monique Alaperrine-Bouyer, La educacio´n de las elites
indı´genas en el Peru´ colonial (Lima: Instituto France´s de Estudios Andinos, 2007); and Martı´n Monsalve, “Curacas
pleitistas y curas abusivos: conflicto, prestigio y poder en los Andes coloniales, siglo XVII,” in Elites indı´genas en los
Andes: nobles, caciques y cabildantes bajo el yugo colonial, David Patrick Cahill and Blanca Tovı´as, eds. (Quito: Abya-Yala,
2003), pp. 159–174, p. 161.
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internal management mechanisms, based on consensus building and decision-
making processes, not just for funding litigation but also for maintaining a
minimum degree of social cohesion. Though very difficult to trace in the
documentation, these mechanisms seem to have gone beyond the particular
interests and actions of the traditional aristocracy of Jauja, that is, the chiefly
lineages invested as caciques principales, to involve as well other indigenous
intermediaries and, to some degree, the commoners who vastly outnumbered
them. In particular, the strategic investment of sapci funds, as well as the
periodic election of indigenous stewards and legal attorneys (procuradores) in
order to secure direct control over these funds, must have become an important
strategy for communities seeking to obtain justice, favor, and redress.61
In a series of decrees and ordinances issued between 1569 and 1575, Viceroy
Toledo outlined the ways in which the Crown expected native authorities to
organize, register, and manage community endowments, framing his reforms
within his larger project for the resettlement of the native population into
Iberian-style pueblos de indios. As such, Toledo’s reorganizations were both
a response to Andean local conditions and a significant effort to reshape these
conditions according to the communitarian traditions of the agro-pastoral
municipalities of early modern Castile. The infrastructures and spaces developed
for the administration of colonial bienes de comunidad among indigenous
communities, which came slowly into being in the 1570s and 1580s, would be
the result of the natives’ creative adaptation of their traditional sapci regimes
and the municipal traditions imported from Spain.62
Toledo entrusted colonial bureaucrats such as the corregidor and the steward of
communal assets, both almost invariably Spaniards, with the task of overseeing
sapci funds at the local and provincial levels. Nevertheless, the viceroy, with his
61. Evidently, holding the cacique status, at least on paper, was not incompatible with occupying some of these
posts. One individual could be identified both as “cacique” and “attorney” or “accountant.” A power of attorney
granted by the “caciques y principales” of Ananguanca to a Spanish attorney in 1579 lists the titles of don Pedro
Poma Lima and don Pedro Chuquillanqui, respectively, as procurador and contador of the repartimiento. Autos
seguidos por don˜a Ine´s de Ribera, heredera de D. Antonio de Ribera contra D. Hernando Vica Alaya, Gobernador del
repartimiento de Ananguanca en la provincia de Jauja, sobre la recuperacio´n de los bienes del extinto, 1579, AGN,
Derecho Indı´gena, Leg. 19, Cuad.93-A. For other examples, see Jose´ Carlos de la Puente Luna, “Felipe Guaman Poma
de Ayala, administrador de bienes de comunidad,” Revista Andina 47 (2008), pp. 9–51.
62. In early modern Castile, municipalities managed their public assets, which could include farmland, woods,
water sources, and pasture, independently, through periodic town meetings and the decisions of annually elected
judges and councils. Municipal property fell under two distinct juridical categories—propios, or property owned by
the municipality as a juridical entity, and the commons, public property set aside for the free use of the residents
of the place. Helen Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain: The Habsburg Sale of Towns, 1516–1700 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 8–18; David E. Vassberg, Land and Society in Golden Age Castile (Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chapt. 2. A few years before Viceroy Toledo arrived in Peru, licentiate
Francisco Falco´n, writing on behalf of “the natives of Peru,” drew a clever comparison between Castilian and native
“commons.” Basing his observations on the Iberian precedent, Falco´n argued against granting Iberian colonizers access
to indigenous public lands, pastures, and water sources. Falco´n, “Representacio´n,” pp. 455–459.
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now proverbial animosity towards caciques, left the everyday management of
these resources in the hands of the officials of the indigenous town council.
The viceroy ordered the appointment of communal administrators or stewards
who were to be directly in charge of the accounting, storage, and circulation
of sapci funds within the pueblo or repartimiento. According to the plan for
pueblo design that would become widespread in the Andes, the “community
houses” (casas de comunidad) were comprised of communal storehouses,
which held cloth, maize, potatoes and other goods, and community treasuries
(cajas de comunidad). The storehouses thus guaranteed the safeguarding and
reproduction of these sapci goods, and they were to be built adjacent to the
town hall, located in the main square. The plan was intended to guarantee that
sapci funds would be under the purview of the elected authorities of the town
council.63
As they implemented this basic infrastructure, native communities quickly
adapted Toledo’s ordinances to their own interests, legal and otherwise. As
the first step in this direction, the ayllus of Jauja campaigned in the 1580s
to remove the Spanish administrator and entrust the management of sapci
holdings to their caciques and town or repartimiento stewards.64 As a result
of these negotiations, by the early 1590s, the repartimientos were keeping
“tribute” and sapci funds in two separate strongboxes, using the former to meet
normal expenses and the latter as a contingency fund and a potential source of
revenue mostly outside the supervision of Spanish authorities. Unspent tribute
funds would pass from the “tribute” lockbox to the “community” lockbox
periodically. Moreover, although the Spanish magistrate kept one of the keys
to the latter, he held no direct control over its contents, relinquishing it to the
63. Jeremy Mumford, Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2012), pp. 96–98; De la Puente Luna, “Felipe Guaman Poma”; Salomon, The Cord Keepers,
pp. 140–142; Salomon,”Collca y Sapc¸i”; Salomon, “Los khipus de Rapaz.” Toledo’s laws and ordinances are included
in Recopilacio´n de leyes de los reinos de las Indias (Madrid: Julia´n de Paredes, 1680), Bk. VI, Tit. IV, Laws II, IX, X,
XIII; Marı´a Justina Sarabia Viejo, ed., Francisco de Toledo: disposiciones gubernativas para el Virreinato del Peru´, 2 vols.
(Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas; Monte de Piedad
y Caja de Ahorros de Sevilla, 1986–1989), vol 1, pp. 1–39, 65–68; vol. 32, pp. 39–46, 59–62, 73–81, 217–266, 409–
449. Based as they were on the ideas of jurist Juan de Matienzo and other prominent reformers of the 1560s, Toledo’s
reforms were not completely original, especially in the case of Jauja. Both the appointment of Spanish corregidores and
indigenous officials and the establishment of community strongboxes and storehouses in Jauja date back to the mid
1560s. Matienzo, Gobierno del Peru´, pp. 71–75. Instruc¸ion para el capita´n Juan de la Reynaga, corregidor del valle de
Xauxa,” 1565, Biblioteca Nacional de Espan˜a, Mss., 1032, esp. instrucciones xxxi, xxxii. For the overarching project
of establishing community treasuries in the Andes, see Viceroy Marquis of Can˜ete to the King, September 15, 1556,
AGI, Lima, 28A.
64. In 1575, a Spaniard, Antonio Bello Gayoso, had replaced one Juan de Bardales as steward of communal
funds in Jauja. The yearly salary of 1,000 assayed pesos was to be paid from the community funds. A few years later, the
communities of Jauja offered to contribute 20.000 pesos to the Crown “para que se les quitasen los Administradores
espan˜oles de sus comunidades.” Informac¸ion fecha de ofic¸io, AGI, Lima, 145, n/fol; Sarabia Viejo, Francisco de Toledo,
vol. 2: pp. 59–62. With an ethnographic eye, Guaman Poma reveals the connection between this colonial indigenous
official and the traditional law of sapci by calling him “collca camayoc, como´n y sapci camayoc.” Guaman Poma de
Ayala, Nueva coro´nica, pp. 193, 284.
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steward of the collective endowment, usually a cacique or a principal who had
been selected in a general council meeting or assembly. The Jauja strongbox
contained the silver generated through the sapci regime, which the ayllus spent
as they saw fit.65
The specific case of the Huancas, as well as that of the neighboring province
of Lucanas, reveals that community lockboxes doubled as communal archives,
another important resource for success in the courtroom. Records stored in
these lockboxes contained, often in separate books, inventories of communal
rents and holdings as well as partial or full transcriptions of titles, deeds,
donations, and other original documents guaranteeing the rights of the ayllus
to their endowment.66 In their everyday duties, stewards combined alphabetic
writing with knotted cords, working alongside indigenous accountants and
town scribes, or sometimes occupying these posts themselves.67 In Jauja during
the 1580s, these mayordomos kept a “community book” or libro de comunidad,
which Guaman Poma significantly calls “libro de las haciendas de los yndios o
yndias pobres.” They relied on this book to organize their accounts with the
corregidor and the local priests. Native tax collectors, for their part, registered
payments in kind from the commoners in knotted strings. They then delivered
these goods to caciques and stewards for their registry in the community book
and, with the participation of the corregidor, for their sale at public auction.
Khipus and alphabetic records in the hands of these stewards then became
an indispensable tool whenever initiating a complaint against a priest or a
magistrate was deemed necessary.
Like their peer officials of the indigenous municipal council, community
stewards would be subject to internal audit during the annual or biannual
meeting (cabildo or asamblea), often held at the beginning of the year. On
such occasions, indigenous accountants and stewards balanced their books
65. Besides biannual tributary quotas per se, the money stored in the “tribute” lockbox covered ordinary
expenditures such as the salary of Spanish magistrates, priests, and caciques. During the term investigation (juicio
de residencia) of corregidor don Martı´n de Mendoza in 1590, each of the repartimientos’ “tribute” lockboxes
were opened, their documents inventoried, and their funds thoroughly counted. The safe boxes of the “bienes de
comunidad,” overseen by the communal stewards, attorneys, and accountants, were not touched by the royal officials.
According to Mendoza, the steward “siempre es un principal que elixe el cabyldo.” Autos promovidos por el Capita´n,
fols. 13v, 21r. There was a third strongbox, that of the “bienes y rentas del hospital,” which I do not discuss here.
66. By the time of Toledo’s 1570 inquiry, the natives of Jauja had managed to form an important archive, which
the viceroy partially destroyed. Kept in different community chests (“caxa y archibo”), it included court cases, royal
decrees, audiencia rulings, and tribute inspections, and documents to be used for litigating and soliciting. Residencia
tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, fol. 139r–139v.
67. The 1566 court case against don Felipe Guacrapaucar lists several authorities who were khipucamayoqs and
contadores. Residencia tomada al doctor Gabriel de Loarte, fol. 240r–240v. For Huamanga, see Curatola Petrocchi
and De la Puente Luna, “Contar concertando”, p. 206. Guaman Poma’s ideal representation of a village councilman
(regidor) depicts an individual holding both a khipu and an accounting book. For a detailed discussion of indigenous
municipal scribes, see Kathryn Burns, “Making Indigenous Archives: The Quilcaycamayoc of Colonial Cuzco,”
Hispanic American Historical Review 91:4 (2011), pp. 665–689.
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and khipus and, if being replaced in their posts, turned over the communal
holdings to the incoming officials.68 Moreover, certain communities of the
central Andes institutionalized the practice of empowering their own attorneys
and solicitors during the town council meeting, in anticipation of the next
year’s legal activities.69 Although much about indigenous electoral customs
during the Habsburg period remains unexplored, late seventeenth-century data
from the Peruvian north coast indicates that some town attorneys were being
selected by “popular acclamation,” even if customary law meant going against
the Toledan ordinances, the candidate of the incumbent officials, or the wishes
of the caciques in power or the Spanish magistrate.70
In these cases, the assembled electors sought consensus rather than the casting
of votes if that might lead to conflict. Future studies of Andean municipal
councils and their internal elections may reveal a significant degree of local
variation, especially vis-a`-vis what the ordinances of the kingdom prescribed
for these occasions.71 Reelection was, in principle, forbidden, and therefore
68. Sarabia Viejo, Francisco de Toledo, vol. 2, pp. 219, 242–250. Accountants and stewards seem to have been
audited also during the investiture of a new Spanishmagistrate. In 1579, the cacique and themayordomo de comunidad
of Santa Ana de Yaure, in the Cuzco region, gave such an account of their repartimiento’s communal holdings before
the corregidor. Francisco Chaisa y Alonso Yaure, cacique y mayordomo del pueblo de Santa Ana de Yaure, hacen
una declaracio´n de los bienes de su repartimiento ante Francisco Ruiz de Navamuel, corregidor del partido de Canas
y Canchis, 1579, AMNAAH, Mss., A353. In his study of the Tupicochan khipus, Salomon discusses similar audit
procedures extensively, showing the striking durability of these assemblies or huayronas, as they are called in Huarochirı´.
Salomon argues that they are indispensable for ayllu equity and that the khipus now held by the Tupicochans evolved
as the interface for this process. Khipus are brought to the civic plenum “to prove that each ayllu had performed all
its community duties and thereby helped reproduce the totality.” Salomon, The Cord Keepers, pp. 200–203, 269.
69. The caciques of the Acos, in Huanta (Huamanga), declared in 1597, “Each new year we appoint solicitors
to use our power of attorney in all our [legal] causes.” The caciques gave power of attorney to two caciques and one
Spanish solicitor in Huamanga. Stern, Peru’s Indian Peoples, p. 121.
70. In January of 1689, don Luis Chayguac, principal of the town of Mansiche, was “aclamado por el comun
de dicho pueblo” for the post of attorney or procurador. Chayguac was elected with the highest number of votes, but
the corregidor voided the process and called for another election with the connivance of the cacique principal and the
priest. When Chayguac secured a viceregal decree ordering his immediate appointment, the attorney then in office
complained to the corregidor. Archivo Regional de La Libertad, Corregimiento, l. 268, c. 3216 [1689]. In the case
of don Clemente Anto discussed by Susan Ramirez, twenty-three members of the community of Lambayeque wrote
to the defender-general of the Indians (protector general de los naturales) in Lima to have Anto reappointed after his
term of service. Members of the cabildo, the cacique, and others opposed his reappointment. Susan E. Ramirez, “Don
Clemente Anto, procurador del comu´n del pueblo de Lambayeque,” in El hombre y los Andes. Homenaje a Franklin
Pease G.Y., Javier Flores E. and Rafael Varo´n G., eds. (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Cato´lica del Peru´, 2002), pp. 831–
840. For a discussion of the contested nature of local elections of native officials in New Spain, see Owensby, Empire
of Law, pp. 213–214. Owensby shows that commoners were sometimes present during deliberations and voting,
“acclaiming and applauding a particular slate of officers, or grumbling at a controversial choice.” The creation of the
post of town attorney (procurador del cabildo) went back to Viceroy Toledo’s reforms of the early 1570s. Sarabia Viejo,
Francisco de Toledo, vol. 2: pp. 218–219, 236. For previous discussions of indigenous procuradores, see Bernard Lavalle´,
Al filo de la navaja: luchas y derivas caciquiles en Latacunga, 1730–1790 (Quito: Corporacio´n Editora Nacional, 2002);
and Sophie Mathis, “Vicente Mora Chimo, de “indio principal” a “procurador general de los indios del Peru´”: cambio
de legitimidad del poder auto´ctono a principios del siglo XVIII,” Bulletin de l’Institut Franc¸ais d’E´tudes Andines 37:1
(2008), pp. 199–215.
71. One cannot ignore, however, that casting lots or voting in favor or against initiating or continuing legal
action, at least by the caciques and other authorities, was also part of these town meetings. Evidence available for the
1562 journey of Tlaxcalan leaders to the royal court seems to indicate that certain decisions were reached in this way.
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attorneys were to be replaced periodically. Yet, as in the case of communal
stewards, the specialized activities of the communal attorney or procurador
demanded reading and writing skills as well as a certain familiarity with judicial
procedure. Because of these qualifications, some village or repartimiento
attorneys probably fulfilled their duties on several occasions or for many years.
Moreover, although their salary was to be paid by the community, some
attorneys relied on their own resources to partially cover the costs of litigating
in provincial towns and cities. Serving as attorney, then, as was the case with
ecclesiastical posts, was gradually turning into someone’s self-funded “duty” to
the community. In that sense, the fulfillment of the post was probably becoming
part of a ladder of civil-ecclesiastic offices that was beginning to crystallize
among Andean communities in the seventeenth century.72
Given the centrality of managing sapci resources and electing communal
legal facilitators such as these attorneys for the survival of their communities,
native groups in Jauja kept these affairs as internal to the group as possible.
As prescribed in the Toledan legislation inspired by the Castilian precedent,
native Andeans were to gather in these town meetings periodically to discuss
communal affairs. These affairs called for the coordination of the different
parcialidades, especially when they involved the ways in which collective
endowments should be invested in legal matters.73 If the still somewhat
mysterious Andean cabildos worked as Mesoamerican ones did, moreover,
While in Spain, the delegates of the four Indian cabeceras or headtowns each cast a vote in order to determine whether
or not they would authorize their solicitor to purchase a mule to go to the royal palace every day (“entraron en votos
sobre la compra;” “pa[ra] yr a negoc¸iar sus cosas a palacio”). AGI, Justicia, 1016, r. 5 [1563], fol. 644r–644v.
72. Alcira Duen˜as’s current project on late colonial cabildos as well as her contribution to this issue support this
assertion, especially in the case of municipal officials (and not just attorneys) who were literate and familiar with court
proceedings. Susan Ramirez notes that don Clemente Anto, attorney or procurator of the town of Lambayeque, was
able to fulfill his post in part because he was “conocido por acaudalado, y de un comercio quantioso.” The attorney
who replaced Anto renounced one month after the election, alleging that “su cargo le hera de bastante peso, i que
asi si los hermanos querı´an que hel, ynterpusiese defensa a fabor [del] dicho su comun havia de ser costeandolo ellos
porque de otro modo no lo podı´a haser porque tenı´a hijos y le acia falta qualquiera plata que pudiera gastar en estas
defensar por lo que no se podia meter en cosa alguna a Beneficio de dicha comunidad.” Ramirez, “Don Clemente,”
pp. 833, 837. In her study of the Sierra Norte of Oaxaca, Yanna Yannakakis finds that local electoral custom varied,
especially after cabildo elections became entangled with the developing fiesta-cargo system. In many towns, “electoral
custom held that caciques could bypass the lower offices in the cargo system and enter at the level of alcalde.” In some
villages, there existed the custom of “discussing new candidates among the entire comu´n before proposing them for
election.” Yannakakis, The Art of Being In-Between, pp. 170, 180.
73. In 1660, the native authorities of Luringuanca appeared before the local magistrate seeking authorization
to sell some of their communal lands and houses. They justified that the sale was necessary, arguing that, after having
“tratado y conferido entre nossotros,” they had “venido de un aquerdo y comformidad en hacer venta dellos.” ARJ,
PN, 2 [1660], fols. 3r–8v. Similarly, the caciques of Lucanas and Laramati “se juntaron a cauildo” in 1581 to discuss
the sale of cattle that belonged to the community. De la Puente Luna, “Felipe Guaman Poma,” p. 33.
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elections and town meetings of this sort would have granted commoners a
“voice” in some of these decisions.74
Indirect evidence regarding the importance of what transpired in these periodic
meetings can be found in the use of collective funds to link the communities
of Jauja with the larger framework of the Habsburg state. Certain communal
investments, especially in the form of real estate, point to the creation, through
the law of sapci, of a more permanent infrastructure associated with seeking
justice and favor at the viceregal court. The ownership of real estate in Lima,
Huamanga, and other colonial centers is a case in point. Although in the 1550s
the Luringuanca ayllus acquired houses in Lima, the seat of the audiencia
and an important locus of their legal activities, the earliest lots (solares), those
intended for lodging the repartimiento’s temporary workers (mitayos) fulfilling
mita duties in the city, were not assigned until the 1560s and 1570s. At that
time, royal officials assigned these lots, located in El Cercado, the Indian
ward that was gradually taking shape on the eastern side of Lima, based on
ethnic affiliation and geographic origin. After appraising each lot, the officials
prorated its value among the tribute payers of Luringuanca, turning this
property into a communal asset, paid for according to the law of sapci.75 These
urban dwellings soon expanded their original function to include lodging for
indigenous authorities whomight be sojourning in Lima for different purposes,
among them, collecting debts and communal revenues or litigating before
the audiencia or the archbishopric. As Viceroy Toledo’s 1570 investigation
and other independent testimony attest, native lords journeying to Lima were
accompanied by an entourage of messengers and retainers (eight to ten in the
case of the polities of Jauja). Since litigation could extend for months or even
years, owning these houses must have shielded the visitors from some of the
high costs of living and litigating in the colonial city.
Moreover, some of the casas y tiendas (houses and stores) collectively owned by
the ayllus of Jauja were located outside the town of El Cercado, on the western
side of Lima’s main square. Some were built below the portals occupied by the
74. Brian Owensby points out that cabildo elections in New Spain were a deeply contested affair, often based on
local custom. He suggests, however, that “while technically only caciques and principales actually spoke as voters” on
these occasions, “commoners too might have a ‘voice’ in elections, for their willingness to listen to upstarts, acclaim a
gobernador who was being challenged, and applaud or grumble as lawsuits were brought could set the political contexts
within which elected officials governed.” Owensby, Empire of Law, p. 226.
75. Mario Ca´rdenas Ayaipoma, La población aborigen del Valle de Lima en el siglo XVI (Lima: Universidad
Nacional Mayor de San Marcos; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientı´ficas, 1989), pp. 46–47; Paul Charney,
Indian Society in the Valley of Lima, Peru, 1532–1824 (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2001), p. 63; Lyn B.
Lowry, “Forging an Indian Nation: Urban Indians under Spanish Colonial Control (Lima, Peru, 1535–1765)” (PhD
diss.: University of California, 1991), pp. 133–134. For the “casas y solar” of the Indians of Chincha, Huarochirı´,
and Luringuanca in El Cercado, see AMNAAH, A182 [1570?]; AMNAAH, B29 [1612]; ARJ, PN, 7 [1649]. fols.
41v–44r.
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scribal offices, only a few steps from the viceroy’s palace and the audiencia. As
stated, the native authorities of Jauja would rent out these houses, purchased
and maintained with communal funds, to notaries and other individuals,
turning them into a secure source of income.76 Just as importantly, the specific
location of these houses, along with the professional identity of some of their
occupants, hints at the relevance that such assets had for community businesses
in which the written word was the fundamental interface. Some indigenous
scribes, attorneys, and interpreters probably received their informal training at
these communal houses.77
Thus, although testimonies about the inner workings of Andean municipal
councils are extremely rare, one can posit that the consensual decision
making associated with the production, distribution, and investment of sapci
resources in Jauja and beyond must have characterized some of the principles
and mechanisms that made litigation possible for the indigenous polities
of the valley.78 Besides the acquisition of casas y tiendas in Lima, these
mechanisms included electing town or repartimiento attorneys, filing petitions
and complaints in different courts and jurisdictions, securing extraordinary
funds for initiating legal action, and choosing representatives who would
journey to the audiencia or to Spain. To judge by the Huanca experience
analyzed here, legal intermediaries linking the community and the courtroom,
such as the procuradores, along with traditional authorities and stewards of
communal patrimony, played a key role in planning and implementing the legal
strategies to be employed in the courtroom.
As revealed in a series of powers of attorney granted by the Luringuanca
communities to their delegates between the 1640s and 1660s, these and other
social actors, all of them connected with the administration of sapci funds,
took an active part in the process of planning before initiating legal action.
As it unfolded every year among the polities of Jauja, the process can be
summarized as follows. Native authorities would meet periodically with the
Spanish magistrate in the town that served as the capital of the province
or the repartimiento. They would then empower two or three of their own
76. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the ayllus of Atunjauja owned casas y tiendas that were located
“devajo de los portales de los escrivanos.” AGN, Caja de Censos, Leg. 8, Doc. 18 [1585]; AGN, Caja de Censos, Leg.
21, Doc. 20; AGN, PN, 70 [1568], fol. 1016r–1016v.
77. Paul Charney reports on one such case, that of the ten year-old brother of an Indian principal who was
learning the profession of public notary in Lima from a Spanish mentor. Paul Charney, “Negotiating Roots: Indian
Migrants in the Lima Valley during the Colonial Period,” Colonial Latin American Historical Review 5:1 (1996), pp.
1–20.
78. Felipe Guaman Pomawrites in theNueva coro´nica y buen gobierno that the Indians of a town or repartimiento
would gather in the town hall in order to discuss whether to demand justice from the indigenous municipal judge
(alcalde), the cacique, the provincial defender, or the corregidor, depending on the nature and importance of the
matter at hand. Guaman Poma de Ayala, Nueva coro´nica, p. 669.
JOSE´ CARLOS DE LA PUENTE LUNA 51
representatives. These indigenous delegates, usually caciques, attorneys, or
accountants, would journey to Lima, Huamanga, or the mining center of
Huancavelica, collect debts and interest owed to the commons, rent or sell
vacant properties, reinvest capital gains, and summon runaway tributaries. Any
money collected would be brought to the community treasuries of the province.
On certain occasions, native authorities would authorize these delegates to
carry out tasks or present demands, such as seeking a reduction of tribute dues
or the commutation of certain tribute items for money, to the audiencia. In
other cases, they were to meet and empower Spanish advocates and laymen,
entrusting them with representing the interests of their communities in legal
forums. The scene of these authorities empowering their delegates en route to
Lima and Huamanga to manage communal affairs repeated itself over the years.
The documents reveal that in Huamanga alone the delegates of Luringuanca
collected several thousand pesos—an average of 600 or 700 annually—as goods
that belonged to sapci, which they used in part to undertake those legal
endeavors that so infuriated Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in the 1570s.79
CONCLUSIONS
Drawing from recent studies on “paper” and ethnographic khipu as well as
on current discussions on indigenous engagements with the colonial system of
justice, this essay has sought to reclaim the pueblo, in its political expression as
a governing council, as the main locus for indigenous collective legal activism
in the rural Andes during the Habsburg era. Based on the evidence included in
Viceroy Toledo’s 1570 investigation about the judicial endeavors of theHuanca
group, I have shown that traditional mechanisms for allocating labor tasks and,
after the Spanish conquest, apportioning tribute quotas among different ayllu
underscored community-wide litigation and the search for favor at local and
metropolitan courts, thus subjecting this type of legal initiative to the social
rules, practices, and expectations governing sapci (communal) endowments
and funds. The possibility of evaluating the performance of pueblo and multi-
pueblo authorities in charge of collective resources and holding these leaders
accountable for any mismanagement or misappropriation of sapci legal funds
was embedded in the planning and assessment of collective action that khipu
devices facilitated. These twin processes conferred a moderate, yet previously
overlooked degree of control in legal strategies and decisions to mid-ranking
79. This composite picture is based on several documents: AGN, Derecho Indı´gena, Cuad. 128, Leg. 9 [1650],
fol. 4r; ARJ, PN, 3 [1640–41], fols. 849r–851v; 902r–v; ARJ, PN, 4 [1657], fols. 435v–436v; ARJ, PN, 7 [1649–
1651, 1653, 1655], fols. 41v–44r; 65v–67r, 91v–93v, 243r–46v, 306r–07v; ARJ, PN, 9 [1665, 1667], fol. 586r–88v,
601r–03r; ARJ, PN, 13 [1681], fols. 623r–624r; BNP, Archivo Astete Concha, Z338 [1650–52], fol. 811r-811v;
BNP, Archivo Astete Concha. Z1010 [1651].
52 THAT WHICH BELONGS TO ALL
ayllu and cabildo authorities and, ultimately, to the Andean commoners who
were directly involved in the reproduction of sapci regimes.
There is much to gain from this re-centering of indigenous collective
legal experiences. First, scholars are discovering that indigenous peoples
created—and, in the case of the khipu, brought back to life through
performative “readings”—many colonial cultural artifacts, including maps,
paintings, chronicles, and primordial titles, with the rules and the languages
of the courtroom in mind. Khipu resurfaced multiple times in the legal
arena not simply because they meticulously registered the human and material
contributions of the different social segments to the collective legal fund (thus
opening the doors for internal auditing and accountability), or because Spanish
magistrates admitted them as evidence, trusting the voices of khipu masters
and the probatory value of their cords. The very materiality of the knotted
strings, their formal structure and inner principles of organization, as well as
the specific social contexts in which they were put to use, reveal some of the
premises and expectations upon which khipu were built and operated, thus
offering a window into still elusive notions of indigenous colonial intra- and
inter-communal justice. Entertaining the idea that native Andeans regarded the
“traditional” order for dividing tasks and services proportionately among the
different segments as “fair” and “just” might help us understand the handful
of intriguing testimonies from the early and mid-colonial periods that link
khipu with the domain of pre-Hispanic “law” and the dispensation of justice
by the Inca. Beyond specific content, what seems to have become embedded in
the Huanca knotted strings about communal pleitos was precisely that central
nexus between the “right” apportioning of tasks and duties according to one’s
capabilities and the general “law of the land” governing the Andes during Inca
times, an ethos recognized and shared by both the Huanca ayllus and the Inca
state.
Second, by moving away from the still-dominant world of traditional elites,
the discernible actors in most colonial documents, the litigation-as-sapci model
highlights the contributions of other local legal facilitators and literate agents,
some of whom were also well versed in the art of the khipu, such as the
cabildo scribes, the indigenous procurators, and the stewards of communal
endowments who became actively engaged in litigation. This privileged
constellation of cabildo and repartimiento intermediaries and the traditional
segment of native caciques and gobernadores only partially overlapped, thus
making possible identifications between these two groups a matter for further
research. The deployment of their strategies was an expression of creative
mediation which infused colonial legal practices with Andean meanings. These
strategies not only reveal certain principles of communal consciousness and
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basic considerations of social balance; they were also essential to allowing
these intermediaries to exercise and remain in their positions as such. After
all, constant access to the justice system constituted a significant effort on the
part of Andean groups and intermediaries to uphold these basic social norms as
they were constantly being transgressed, sometimes from within, by the agents
of the new colonial order.
Continual efforts at compromise and consensus building must have developed
inside native governing councils and regular assemblies whenever there was
a need to set sapci funds aside for litigation, to adopt a specific course of
legal action, to prosecute or drop a lawsuit, or to appoint and dispatch
native attorneys to the viceregal capital. A further exploration of these internal
mechanisms and the main actors involved in them—community stewards,
prosecutors, and scribes—might help us refine our understanding of broad
categories such as “cacique” or “Andean elite.” Especially in rural settings, the
interlocking of cacique and cabildo power, at least in the sphere of community
lockboxes and the sapci funds that made litigation possible, seems to have been
more significant than previously thought. Among the Huancas, commoners
generated the surplus needed by their authorities to seek redress in the colonial
courts. In some instances, these tribute payers themselves seem to have been
at least partially involved in initiating legal efforts that depended on ad hoc
funds and collective endowments, perhaps bringing problems and complaints
to the attention of their leaders during periodic meetings and demanding that
they engage with royal authorities at local, regional, and metropolitan levels. In
other cases, native leaders must have acted on their own initiative, identifying
problems and then requisitioning additional funds and communal backing to
solve them in the courts.
Additional research in local archives will likely reveal that the ayllus of the
Jauja valley were not unique in their communal strategies for gaining access
to the justice system through the effective management of collective holdings.
At the same time, new research will help to refine the litigation-as-sapci model
presented in this article, particularly in light of Andean polities and communities
other than theHuancas, to which it is much less readily applicable. Their remote
geographic location and the relative absence of collective endowments due to
mismanagement and privatization, permanent migration, land dispossession,
and excessive fiscal burdens must have meant that many communities did not
enjoy such ready access to Lima’s high court of appeal, the main locus of
the legal judicial activity explored in this work. In that sense, “peaks” and
“downturns” in indigenous engagements with the justice system throughout
the colonial period, so far associated with certain regions and groups like
the Huancas, could be also linked to the increases and declines in these
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collective holdings and the particular actions of those in charge of defending
and expanding them—and not only to the venality and corruption of colonial
judges, the varying policies of the Crown, or the relative openness of the system
of legal aid devised by the state in the 1570s.
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